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ABSTRACT 
 The goal of this dissertation was to experimentally examine two different means 
through which social factors can influence children’s inhibitory control abilities: 1) a top 
down approach, through modeling of self-control skills, and 2) a bottom up approach via 
increased arousal due to their mere presence in the child’s environment. To the best of 
my knowledge, little research has examined children’s imitative abilities in the context of 
learning behavioral inhibition strategies, nor the influence of minimal social presence in 
the form of a mere image of eyes on children’s cognitive inhibition performance.  
In Chapters 2 and 3, I systematically explored variables that may affect children’s 
acquisition of self-control strategies from adults in a delay-of-gratification task. In Study 
1, I explored the effect of adult’s verbal and behavioral information on preschool-aged 
children’s imitation of self-regulatory strategies with a particular interest in the cases 
when the verbal and behavioral information conflict. Children performed a delay-of-
gratification task after observing an adult perform the same task. Across four between-
subjects conditions, the model either did or did not state her intention to complete the 
task, modeled the strategies, and then either did or did not complete the task successfully. 
Children who observed the model successfully complete the task were more likely to 
	
	 viii 
imitate the strategies and successfully wait when they performed the same task, as well as 
in a novel self-control task, irrespective of the model’s communicated intent.  
In addition to examining the role of the information provided by an adult model, I 
investigated the role of model characteristics. In Study 2, using the same paradigm as in 
the first study, I explored whether 4- to 5-year-old children demonstrated a preference to 
imitate self control strategies from a racially ingroup versus a racially outgroup adult.  
Results revealed an absence of significant racial group preference in a sample of children 
of minority background (Chinese American), but significant racial group preferences 
among Caucasian children. Caucasian children were significantly more likely to imitate 
modeled strategies and to successfully wait when they observed an adult who was a racial 
ingroup member versus a racial outgroup member (East Asian). These findings were even 
more robust for the 5-year-old children, suggesting that racial group preferences may 
develop with age.   
The final two studies presented in Chapter 4 demonstrate that social factors can 
also influence inhibitory control abilities from a bottom up approach. In Study 3a, 
children either performed a computerized Flanker task in the presence of a picture of 
(angry) eyes (minimal social presence) or in the presence of a picture of flowers (non-
social presence). While there was no significant difference in performance between the 
two conditions for children with less developed theory of mind, participants with more 
developed theory of mind demonstrated facilitated performance in the social presence 
condition. In Study 3b, I further explored the effect of minimal social presence on 
inhibitory control performance by adding a third condition, a picture of happy eyes. The 
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facilitative effect was not found in the happy eyes condition, which may suggest that 
increase in arousal may have been a mechanism by which the social stimulus affected 
performance.  
 Taken together, the findings from these studies identify social variables and 
conditions, both from a top down as well as from a bottom up approach, that affect 
children’s inhibitory control. This has important implications on how we can optimize 
teaching of self-control strategies in order to promote development of children’s 
behavioral inhibition, as well as on how we understand the implicit role of social context, 
even seemingly minimal social stimuli, that can facilitate children’s cognitive inhibition. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Inhibitory control is one of the core executive functions (Lehto et al., 2003, 
Miyake et al., 2000). Diamond (2013) defines it as the ability “to control one’s attention, 
behavior, thoughts, and/or emotions to override a strong internal predisposition or 
external lure, and instead do what’s more appropriate or needed” (p. 2). There is 
behavioral inhibition, which is also referred to as self-control, and cognitive inhibition, 
which can also be referred to as interference control (Diamond, 2013). Behavioral 
inhibition, or self-control, involves control over one’s behavior and/or emotions, such as 
voluntarily postponing immediate gratification in order to obtain a delayed but preferred 
outcome (delay of gratification). Interference control involves selective attention, 
focusing on what we choose and suppressing attention to other stimuli, which is 
commonly measured by the Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Promoting inhibitory 
control is one of the hallmarks of early child development (Mittal et al., 2012) and it has 
been shown to be strongly predictive of positive outcomes, such as better physical and 
mental health and academic success, throughout the lifespan (Moffitt et al., 2011, 2012).  
Mischel first demonstrated the immediate and long-term outcomes of delay of 
gratification performance in a longitudinal study using his seminal delay paradigm. The 
delay paradigm, which entails presenting preschool-aged children with a marshmallow 
and asking them to wait until the experimenter returns to get two marshmallows, has 
since been widely used to study children’s developing self-control abilities. Mischel et al. 
(1988, 1989, 2011) found long-lasting effects of an early ability to delay: those who 
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successfully delayed gratification as children were rated as more rational and socially 
competent, scored higher on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), and were better able to 
cope with frustration and stress as adults. Another longitudinal study found that delay 
time in minutes were associated with higher ninth grade GPA and standardized test 
scores (Duckworth, Tsukayama, & Kirby, 2013). Mischel and Ayduk (2004) attributed 
self-control as the underlying mechanism of the relation between delay of gratification 
and future success. Other studies have confirmed the strong link between early delay of 
gratification abilities and important life outcomes. For example, studies found that 
deficits in self-control were directly related to childhood attention and conduct problems 
(Mittal et al., 2012; Martel & Nigg, 2006; Olson et al., 1990) and issues associated with 
peer relationships, delinquency, substance use, and academics (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992; 
Eisenberg et al., 1993; Fabes et al., 1999; Pelham & Bender, 1982; Spira & Fischel, 
2005; Wills et al., 2006; Vazsonyu & Belliston, 2007). Given the longitudinal impact of 
the early ability to engage in inhibitory control, there has been an increased interest in 
children’s inhibitory control development. Furthermore, since inhibitory control develops 
significantly and rapidly in the preschool years (Diamond, 2002; Frye et al., 1995; 
Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994; Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & 
Vandergeest, 1996; Moriguchi & Hiraki, 2009; Zelazo & Muller, 2002), much of the 
focus has been on this age group.  
Preschool individual differences, such as temperament and gender, in delay of 
gratification have been implicated in children’s developing executive function abilities 
(Kochanska & Knaack, 2003; Cipriano & Stifter, 2010; Bjorklund & Kipp, 1996; Funder, 
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Block, & Block, 1983). For example, some research suggests that women and girls are 
better able than men and boys to delay gratification (Bjorklund & Kipp, 1996). However, 
now a large body of work has highlighted the importance of social and environmental 
influences (McCabe, Cunnington, & Brooks-Gunn, 2004; Vygotsky, 1978). In fact, social 
influences have been shown to override individual level factors and predispositions on 
children’s self-control further emphasizing the crucial role of social context (Strayhorn, 
2002). The study of inhibitory control and its underlying cognitive processes are now 
being examined within social contexts (Lewis & Carpendale, 2009) and inhibitory control 
is considered to be “more social” than previously believed (Moriguchi, Kanda, Ishiguro, 
& Itakura, 2010). 
The literature on social influence on children’s inhibitory control, especially self-
control (delay of gratification) has relied almost exclusively on correlational studies 
documenting the significant relationship between general parental characteristics (e.g., 
sensitivity, responsiveness, proactive) or other social factors (e.g., non-parental care 
settings, peer groups, neighborhoods and cultural contexts) and children’s self-control 
(Shelleby et al., 2012; Bernier, Carlson, & Whipple, 2010; von Suchodoletz et al., 2011; 
Doan, Fuller-Rowell, & Evans, 2012; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988; Lee et al., 
2008). There is still a scarcity of research on the specific mechanisms by which social 
context influences inhibitory control in young children (Fox & Calkins, 2003).  
In the following chapters, I explore two research questions regarding the effect 
of social context on children’s developing inhibitory control abilities.  
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1) To what extent can children be explicitly taught self-control strategies? Using 
a variation of Mischel’s delay task, children first observed an adult complete the 
waiting task while modeling self-control strategies as she attempted to wait. 
Children were then asked to complete the same task. In Chapter 2, children’s 
sensitivity to adult’s conflicting verbal and behavioral information when 
acquiring modeled self-control strategies was examined. In Chapter 3, I explored 
children’s sensitivity to the model’s social group status. 
2) To what extent can children’s self-control be influenced implicitly such as by 
mere social presence? This question was explored in two studies (Study 3a, 3b), 
presented in Chapter 4. In Study 3a, I explored the effect of an image of angry 
eyes on children’s inhibitory control performance. The impact of children’s 
developing understanding of mental states on this effect was also explored. In 
Study 3b, the impact of the emotional valence of social presence was examined by 
studying the effect of an image of happy eyes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Research Model 
Mere social presence 
Study 3a—Image of Angry Eyes  
Study 3b—Image of Happy Eyes 
INHIBITORY CONTROL 
 
Explicit teaching of inhibitory control skills 
Study 1—Model’s Verbal and Behavioral Information 
Study 2—Model’s Social Group Status 
TOP-DOWN 
BOTTOM-UP 
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Before turning to these studies, I review the existing empirical literature associated 
with these questions in order to provide context and to identify the current gaps in the 
literature that these studies aim to address. I begin by exploring the general literature on 
children’s learning and development of self-control strategies, as well as learning 
mechanisms and social cues that influence children’s learning from others in the delay 
context. Then in order to situate the second research question, I present the literature on 
mere social presence on self-control and review key variables that may mediate this 
relationship in young children.  
To what extent can children be explicitly taught self-control strategies? 
Children’s development of self-control is influenced by several factors (Wigfield, 
Klauda & Cambria, 2011) including biological maturation and development of self-
control skills. Although the development of skills can be related to age and biological 
maturation, there is great variability among same-aged children, which in turn can result 
in discrepancies in regulatory abilities. Therefore, it is important to explore factors that 
may influence this like children’s learning of self-control skills from social others. 
Social others can directly influence children’s self-control abilities through explicit 
teaching and modeling of regulatory strategies. One of the goals of this dissertation is to 
experimentally explore the social learning process involved in the development of self-
regulation and acquiring regulatory skills more specifically. 
Social influences on the development of self-control skills. A body of research has 
investigated children’s development of strategies, which Mischel and Mischel (1983) 
refer to as “rules,” that facilitate children’s ability to wait in the delay of gratification 
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paradigm (Holtz & Lehman, 1995; Yates & Mischel, 1979; Yates, Yates & Beasley, 
1987). Basic rules include covering the rewards so that they are not in view and engaging 
in task-oriented as opposed to consummatory (focusing on the consummatory properties 
of the rewards), ideation (Mischel & Mischel, 1987). Studies have demonstrated a clear 
developmental progression in children’s knowledge and understanding of effective delay 
strategies (Holtz & Lehman, 1995; Mischel & Mischel, 1983). Mischel and Mischel 
(1987) conducted a two-part study to explore children’s understanding of delay strategies 
using the delay-of-gratification paradigm. In the first study, children ages three to six 
were asked 1) whether it would help them most to wait for the two marshmallows if the 
marshmallows were left out or if they were covered while they were waiting, 2) what 
they could say to themselves to help them wait with the rewards left out in front of them, 
and 3) which of the two phrases they were presented with would help them wait 
(“consummatory ideation: “the marshmallows taste yummy and chewy” and task-
oriented ideation: “I am waiting for the two marshmallows” or abstract ideation: “The 
marshmallows are puffy like clouds”). They found that the preschoolers did not appear to 
know what would make delay less difficult, whereas most of the third graders knew that 
not attending to the rewards would facilitate delay. Moreover, the majority of preschool-
aged children did not offer clear or viable strategies for effective delay, whereas by third 
grade, children were able to offer a number of potentially viable delay strategies and by 
6th grade strategies were more sophisticated (i.e., prefer distraction from the temptation, 
self-instructions about task-contingency, and cool ideation about rewards). Mischel and 
Mischel (1987) examined this developmental progression further in a second study using 
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a larger sample of children. They found that 5-year-olds began to significantly reject 
consummatory ideation about the rewards in favor of task-oriented ideation as a strategy 
for waiting and by age 6, most children preferred to cover the rewards as a strategy for 
effective delay of gratification. Interestingly, they also found that the younger four-year-
olds preferred to expose the rewards, an objectively delay-defeating strategy that has 
been shown to hinder delays most dramatically for children this age (e.g., Mischel, 1974, 
1981a)   
Taken together, these findings indicate that during the preschool years children 
are starting to develop their abilities to engage in strategies to facilitate self-control. Thus, 
interventions to promote self-control development would be optimally efficacious during 
these years. Although children may naturally progress in their development of effective 
strategies (Mischel & Mischel 1987) and their ability to delay gratification (Mischel & 
Metzner, 1962) as they get older, maturational changes only account for some of the 
variability in delay of gratification performance among children.  In addition to the 
importance of children’s cognitive self-control ability on their delay of gratification 
performance, recent research has highlighted the causal role of environmental and social 
factors. As Vygotsky theorized, the quality of social interactions a child experiences have 
a significant effect on the development of self-regulation. These social factors need to be 
further explored in order to understand how to effectively promote this ability in young 
children.  In this dissertation, I explore the impact of a model’s verbal and behavioral 
cueing (Chapter 2) as well as the effect of social group information (model race; Chapter 
3) on children’s ability to delay gratification.  Given the dearth of literature on these two 
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areas, the findings from these studies have both theoretical significance and important 
implications for practice and intervention.   
Empirical research on interventions aimed to promote self-control 
development. Studies have investigated interventions that seek to teach preschool-aged 
children self-control skills and have demonstrated that such abilities are “learned and 
highly teachable” (Whitebread & Basilio, 2012, p. 16). Neilans and Israel (1981), for 
example, demonstrated that their self-regulation strategies training program for 7 to 13-
year-old children with behavioral issues significantly improved their disruptive behavior 
and on-task behavior. In fact, a recent meta-analysis of studies across the primary school 
age-range revealed impressive effect sizes for interventions involving the teaching of 
self-regulation strategies (i.e., metacognitive strategies, cognitive strategies, motivational 
strategies) as they relate to academic learning (Dignath, Buettner & Langfeldt, 2008). A 
more recent self-regulation intervention study by Luczynski, Hanley and Rodriguez 
(2014) evaluated the effects of the preschool life skills program (PLS; Hanley, Heal, 
Tiger & Ingvarsson, 2007; Luczynski & Hanley, 2013) on the acquisition and 
maintenance of communication and self-control skills as a means of decreasing and 
preventing problem behavior in preschoolers at risk for school failure. In addition to 
teaching functional communication skills, the intervention promoted children’s learning 
of delay and denial tolerance skills via instructions, modeling, role playing, and 
differential reinforcement. Children learned to tolerate delays after the acquisition of 
communication responses. For example, children were taught to say “okay” and return to 
their activity and wait patiently for 30 s to 1 min after a delay (e.g., “in a little bit,” 
	
	
9 
“later,” and “wait please”) or denial cue (e.g., “It’s not available,” “No, I am going to use 
that item,” and “I am sorry, you cannot use it”). A descriptive praise was provided if 
children used a correct skill. When a child used an incorrect skill, the experimenter 
described, modeled, or role-played the skill or a combination of these strategies. 
Children’s generalization of learned skills when interacting with unfamiliar teachers in 
unfamiliar classrooms were assessed. Learned skills were shown to be maintained even 
three months after completion of training. This intervention highlighted the fundamental 
role of verbal cues as well as behavioral modeling in children’s learning of self-
regulatory strategies.  
Other research has found that adult verbalization alone can affect children’s delay 
behaviors (Pressley et al., 1983). In a study conducted by Kochanska, Coy, and Murray 
(2001), the development of self-regulation in 108 young children during the first 4 years 
of life was examined longitudinally, exploring children’s early compliance with their 
caregivers’ verbal demands to regulate their behaviors. In the Do context, the caregiver 
requested that the child sustain an unpleasant, tedious activity, and in the Don’t context 
the caregiver required that the child suppress a pleasant, attractive activity. The study 
revealed that the two contexts differed in that the Do context presented a greater 
regulatory challenge to young children than the Don’t context. These findings 
demonstrated that children are sensitive to the quality of the adults’ verbalizations when 
engaging in self-regulation – but that their sensitivity to verbal information varies based 
on valence of the context. 
The underlying assumption of the experimental studies and behavioral 
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interventions is that adults can enhance children’s self-regulation skills by 
complementing the demonstration of self-regulation strategies and skills with mere verbal 
instruction. However, in naturalistic contexts, children are not only provided with verbal 
cues, but also the adult’s own success or failure in self-regulation. Yates (1974) explored 
the effect of both adult’s verbal and behavioral cuing on 9-year-old children’s delay 
choices. In his study, children either watched a televised film of an adult female model 
who demonstrated high-delay behavior (modeling film), verbalized good reasons for 
waiting (persuasion film) or who demonstrated high-delay behavior and verbalized 
reasons for waiting (persuasion-modeling), or watched a film of a model exhibiting 
neutral behavior (control group). He found that subjects in each of the treatment groups 
were more likely to exhibit delay choices immediately after watching the film and at 4-
week follow up than those in the control group. This pattern of increased delay choices 
from pre-exposure to post-exposure was most evident in the persuasion-modeling group. 
In a more recent study, preschoolers who were instructed to pretend to be Superman or a 
child with the same patient qualities as Superman were more likely to delay gratification 
than children who simply watched a video of Superman (Karnioloi, Galill, Shtilerman & 
Nalm, 2011). These findings highlight how verbal cues and instruction when coupled 
with modeling of delay behavior can promote delayed gratification in young children. 
In addition, these findings are consistent with previous research that demonstrated 
the importance of behavioral modeling in children’s self-regulation development. 
Skinner’s (1948) series of programmed steps to teach self-control to young children 
emphasizes the “power of example.” Specifically, watching the behavior of others, and 
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its rewarding or punishing consequences, organizes and motivates the behavior of the 
observer (Bandura, 1986, 1997; Zimmerman, 1989, 1995). Bandura and Walters (1963) 
described how children acquire self-control through observational learning from 
individuals who model self-control behaviors. For example, after elementary school-aged 
children observed an adult model demonstrate a behavior counter to what they had 
chosen to do (delay or not delay reward) and verbalize the reason for making that choice, 
they were more likely to demonstrate the same behavior as the model in a delay of 
gratification task immediately following the observation as well as at follow-up four to 
five weeks later. More specifically, the “low-delay” children, who demonstrated a 
marked preference for immediate reward, chose to delay their reward 50% of the time 
after observing the model demonstrate delay behavior. On the other hand, the “high-
delay” children who had exhibited a consistent pattern of delay behavior, chose 
immediate rewards 60% of the time. These findings highlight the role of social 
transmission of self-control behavior via modeling of successful outcome, which can 
influence decision to delay gratification despite predispositions (Bandura & Mischel, 
1965). Moreover, Strayhorn (2002) noted that these findings explicitly demonstrated how 
“a single brief environmental influence” overrode children’s predispositions, whether it is 
genetic and/or temperament. 
An open question from the studies and interventions discussed above is the 
specific mechanism through which parent’s verbal demands affect children’s self-
regulation – especially over and above modeled behavior.  Studies to date have examined 
the role of verbal cues and behavioral modeling separately and together, but not when 
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these two cues conflict, making it challenging to determine which of the two cues 
children weight more strongly. In naturalistic contexts it is plausible that adults may 
provide conflicting verbal and behavioral information. For example, parents may state the 
importance of not snacking before meals (the communicative intent), but then contradict 
their verbal intent by snacking before a meal (the behavioral outcome). Under these 
situations, it is not clear whether young children prioritize an adult’s communicative 
intent or the outcome of the adult’s behavior. Furthermore, the extent to which the social 
group characteristics of the model affect children’s self-regulation has yet to be explored. 
Underlying learning mechanisms and social cues. The underlying learning 
mechanisms of this social transmission process and the factors that influence this process 
will be explored in the first two chapters of this dissertation. Although Bandura and 
Mischel (1965) explored the role of social imitation on children’s success or failure in 
delaying gratification, identifying vicarious reinforcement and the model’s nurturance or 
power as key social variables in this learning process, they did not explore children’s 
strategies when engaging in a particular outcome. Thus, in my dissertation I aim to not 
only explore children’s learning of success or failure in delaying gratification, but also 
their acquisition of specific self-control strategies. The broader literature on children’s 
imitative learning suggests that children have a tendency to imitate adults with high 
fidelity, imitating even causally irrelevant and goal-irrelevant actions, referred to as 
‘overimitation’ (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; 
Meltzoff, 1998; Nielsen & Tomasello, 2010). For instance, children when learning about 
the conventional nature of a novel tool have been shown to reproduce the irrelevant 
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actions demonstrated by the adult even when these actions were clearly indicated as 
unnecessary and redundant (Nielsen & Cornelia, 2011). In a way, the task of learning 
how to self-regulate (certain strategies) may be similar to learning how to use novel tools. 
In both situations the information to be learned is ambiguous (Jaswal, 2010) and would 
be more easily learned from an adult than through firsthand experience (Harris & Koenig, 
2006). Specifically, in the case of learning regulatory strategies, the act of self-control 
itself is not immediately intuitive for young children. Engaging in activities that are not 
immediately rewarding (e.g., exercise) or inhibiting certain behaviors (e.g., eating certain 
foods), confers benefits that are not immediately salient for young children due to the 
temporal delay and the imperceptible causal relationship between self-regulation and the 
outcome (e.g., exercise leads to increased metabolism). Learning through imitation of and 
reliance on adult’s actions and testimony (e.g., Harris & Corriveau, 2011; Harris, 2012) 
may be more feasible and efficient in such situations. 
Model variables. When children turn to adults to learn regulatory strategies, it 
may be assumed that children simply imitate the strategies and behavior that are taught or 
modeled to them. However, based on the social learning literature, children demonstrate 
rational imitation (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002). 
Specifically, they demonstrate a sophisticated sensitivity to various social cues including 
verbal and behavioral cues, as well as characteristics of the model such as the model’s 
social group status. These social variables can influence children’s decision (implicit or 
explicit) to learn from the model. For example, children may determine that the model is 
not reliable based on the information they provide or simply based on familiarity or 
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affiliation. In fact, a recent body of research suggests that social trust influences 
individuals’ willingness to delay gratification. For example, adults and children are less 
willing to wait for rewards from individuals they perceive as less trustworthy or 
unreliable (Harris & Madden, 2002; Michaelson, de la Vega, Chatham, & Munakata, 
2013; Mischel, 1961; Mahrer, 1956). In one study by Kidd, Palmeri, and Aslin (2012), 
young children’s performance on a delay-of-gratification tasks was strongly influenced 
by children’s rational decision-making process about environmental reliability. The study 
tested 28 preschool-aged children who were assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions—unreliable (researcher returns after child is asked to wait without the 
promised better set of art materials) and reliable (research returns after child is asked to 
wait with the promised set of art materials). With these two sources of evidence about the 
experimenter as well as the testing situation, children were then immediately invited to 
complete Mischel’s delay of gratification task, which entailed either waiting until the 
experimenter to return (15 minutes) to be rewarded two as opposed to one marshmallow 
or consuming the one marshmallow. Findings demonstrated that children’s beliefs about 
whether waiting would pay off predicted their wait-times, with children in the reliable 
condition waiting significantly longer than those in the unreliable condition. These 
results revealed that social trust, in the experimenter and/or in the task situation, affected 
children’s decision to delay gratification, and suggested that children engaged in rational 
decision-making when deciding whether to wait or not. 
Would children also demonstrate rational decision-making in the context of 
learning self-regulatory strategies from an adult who they may deem less reliable or 
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different from them? Children may be sensitive to both the characteristics and quality of 
the adult’s pedagogical information, as well as to the characteristics of the adult. In this 
dissertation, the influence of adult’s conflicting verbal and behavioral information 
(Chapter 2), as well as the adult’s social group status (Chapter 3), on children’s learning 
of self-regulatory strategies from adult models were investigated. 
 The literature to date highlight the influence of social learning of self-control 
strategies and the extent to which social cues influence this. The second goal of my 
dissertation is to explore the extent to which implicit, mere social presence, influences 
children’s self-control abilities. Below I review the literature associated with this 
question.  
Does mere social presence affect children’s self-control abilities? 
Although social others can certainly influence children’s inhibitory control 
abilities through verbal instruction and direct modeling of specific self-control strategies 
and behavior, adults can also influence children’s inhibitory control through their mere 
presence. The effect of being watched has been demonstrated to modify not only changes 
in behavior, but also changes in cognitive processes such as interference control and 
selective attention (Huguet et al., 1999; Miyazaki, 2013). Specifically, research on adults 
has demonstrated that social presence either facilitates or impairs speed and accuracy of 
performance on executive function tasks via increase or decrease in arousal (Zajonc, 
1965), or distraction due to cognitive overload and restriction in attention focus (Baron, 
1986). 
Huguet et al. (1999) found that participants who performed the Stroop task, a 
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measure of inhibitory control, attention, and cognitive flexibility, in the presence of a 
confederate who sat opposite of the participant, demonstrated reduced Stroop 
interference, the time to identify the ink colors of incongruent words (i.e., ‘red’ printed in 
green ink), compared to participants who performed the task alone or with an “invisible” 
audience. These findings demonstrate that even a relatively simple social situation, in the 
absence of direct feedback or reinforcement, can affect performance on the Stroop task. 
Furthermore, the authors suggest that the significant reduction in memory recognition for 
the Stroop words in the social presence condition provides evidence for the restriction in 
attention due to the social presence. The effect of social presence has also been explored 
in memory performance (Borden & Walker, 1978; Ganzer, 1968; Geen, 1973; Kumar & 
Acharya, 1982; Pessin, 1933), visuospatial attention (Wuhr & Huestegge, 2010), motor 
tasks (Bates, 1989; Oviatt, 2005; Straus, 2002) and facial expressiveness (Wagner & 
Smith, 1991).  
Note that even across these various domains, the findings are mixed; the direction 
of social facilitation versus social inhibition, as well as the interpretation for the effect of 
social presence are still subject to debate. For example, in the literature on cognitive 
control, the effect of mere presence has been attributed to evaluation apprehension 
(Carver & Scheier, 1981a), distraction (Baron, others arousal (Platania & Moran, 2001; 
Zajonc, 1965), threat from uncertainty about the other person’s behavior (Guerin & 
Innes, 1982), or competition of working memory resources (Wuhr & Huestegee, 2010). 
Furthermore, different variables have been explored such as the nature and complexity of 
the task (Bond & Titus, 1983) and also in varying conditions of social presence including, 
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familiarity, monitorability, level of presence (i.e., artificial presence, passive presence, 
implied presence, embodied presence, and active presence; Guerin, 1983) of the social 
other as well as joint action (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006) and simple social interactions 
(Karremans, Verwijmeren, Pronk, & Reitsma, 2009; Richeson & Shelton, 2003; 
Richeson & Trawalter, 2005) with the social other. These different forms and levels of 
social presence have been found to have differential effects on cognitive control tasks. 
Notably, it has been demonstrated that social presence even in minimal form such as 
passive or artificial presence, can significantly affect cognitive control processes (Marino 
et al., 2015; Schilbach et al., 2011). 
More recent social facilitation research has explored the effect of yet even more 
minimal forms of social presence. For instance, one study used a photograph of a favorite 
television character (Gardner & Knowles, 2008) and in another study, a computer display 
of a “virtual” person (Zanbaka, Ulinski, Goolkasian & Hodges, 2004), and found that 
these “artificial” forms of social presence facilitated performance on simple, familiar 
tasks (i.e., copying words with dominant hand). Moreover, in the broader social 
psychology literature, a number of studies have shown that just an eye-like stimulus or an 
image of eyes can increase cooperative and prosocial behavior. Haley and Fessler (2005) 
who first explored the effect of eye images on behavior found that those exposed to an 
eye-like stimulus demonstrated an increase in donations to strangers in an experimental 
economic game, the Dictator Game (DG). While previous studies have shown that people 
tend to behave more generously when under the gaze of real human eyes (Bull & Gibson-
Robinson, 1981l Kurzban, 2001), this was the first study to show that eye-like images, 
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even though artificial and not realistic, were sufficient to increase prosocial behavior 
(Nettle et al., 2013). This finding has been replicated and/or expanded upon in other DG 
studies as well (Nettle et al., 2013; Oda et al., 2011, Rigdon et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
the effect of eye images have been demonstrated in other forms of prosocial behavior 
such as greater disapproval of moral transgressions (Bourrat, Baumard, & McKay, 2011), 
in other contexts using different games (Burnham & Hare, 2007) and in more naturalistic 
settings (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006; Ernest-Jones, Nettle, & Bateson, 2011). 
Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006) used an image of a real pair of (angry) eyes in a field 
experiment and found that placing this image, as opposed to the control image of flowers, 
on an honesty box, nearly tripled donations. While in the previous study, one may argue 
that the effect of the eye stimulus was due to the effect of drawing customers’ attention to 
the verbal message on the poster, here in this study they found that the eyes effect was 
independent of whether the message on the poster was congruent or incongruent with the 
behavior being observed. Moreover, Ernest-Jones, Nettle and Bateson (2011) found that 
the context mediated this effect, when an image of a pair of eyes was placed in a cafeteria 
and the cafeteria was less busy, people were more likely to remove litter from their tables 
(Ernest-Jones, Nettle & Bateson, 2011). Similarly, Ekstrom (2012) found that on days 
when fewer people visited the supermarket, donations to charity at the store increased by 
30% when the image of eyes were displayed. Powell, Roberts, and Nettle (2012) 
replicated these findings in their study. This effect of simple images of watching eyes on 
prosocial behavior has been demonstrated in a number of other studies as well (Haley & 
Fessler, 2007; Keller & Pfattheicher, 2011; Nettle et al., 2012; Oda, Niwa, Honma & 
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Hiraishi, 2011; Powell, Roberts & Nettle, 2012; Rigdon, Ishii, Watabe & Kitayama, 
2009). 
Ernest-Jones et al. (2011) proposed that the eye image effect is not simply due to 
the eyes grabbing people’s attention, but because they induced the feeling of being 
watched. Similarly, Bateson et al. (2006) argued that because the neurons in the human 
perceptual system respond selectively to stimuli involving faces and eyes (Emery, 2000; 
Haxby et al., 2000 as cited in Bateson et al., 2006), the eye image, although static, could 
have exerted an automatic and unconscious effect on the participants’ perception that 
they were being watched. Indeed, studies show that people have an (at least partially) 
automatic bias to attend to the eyes of others (Itier, Villate, & Ryan, 2007; Laidlaw, 
Risko, & Kingstone, 2012) and spend the majority of their fixations on the eyes across a 
range of social stimuli including not only complex dynamic scenes but also static scenes 
and isolated images of face (Walker-Smith et al., 1977; Henderson et al., 2005). This bias 
toward the eyes have been found to be a “true interest in the eyes” and socially based 
(Birmingham et al., 2008). Furthermore, direct eye gaze in particular is a strong social 
signal, which activates distinct processes compared to other gaze directions like averted 
gaze (Conty et al., 2007). Conty et al. (2007) found that participants who looked at direct 
gaze showed a greater amplitude and longer duration of event-related potential (ERP) in 
contrast to those who looked at an averted gaze. This heightened physiological arousal 
such as increased galvanic skin responses, heart rate and brain activity (as recorded via 
EEG) in response to direct gaze has been demonstrated in a number of other studies 
(Ellsworth et al., 1978; Gale, Kingsly, Brooks & Smith, 1978; Kleinke, 1986; Kleinke & 
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Pohlen, 1971; Nichols and Champress, 1971). Such increased physiological arousal may 
subsequently affect task performance. For example, Sanbonmatsu and Kardes (1988) 
found that heightened arousal states reduced the amount of processing capacity available 
for performing cognitive tasks, which consequently disrupted performance on these tasks. 
The literature the effect of eye gaze on inhibitory control is scarce. A recent study 
examined the effect of gaze direction signals on adults’ inhibitory control performance 
(Marino et al., 2015), but no study has explored the effect of a mere picture of eyes on 
children’s inhibitory control.  
As discussed earlier, a picture of eyes has been shown to have similar effects to 
real eye gaze in that it can evoke a feeling of being watched thereby enhancing 
cooperative behavior, for example. But whether this minimal social stimulus can have a 
significant effect on inhibitory control performance has yet to be explored. Furthermore, 
in examining this effect it is important to take into account key variables such as 
children’s developmental level, specifically their social cognition (Theory of Mind), and 
the emotional valence of stimuli that could mediate the effect and could possibly be 
underlying mechanisms. In Studies 3a and b of my dissertation, I explore the relation 
between children’s Theory of Mind abilities and the presence or absence of angry eyes 
(Study 3a) and happy eyes (Study 3b) on children’s inhibitory control ability. 
 
Conclusion 
The series of studies in this dissertation experimentally examined social influence, 
both explicit and implicit, on children’s developing inhibitory control abilities. Inhibitory 
control is an essential aspect of emotional, behavioral, social, and academic functioning, 
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and yet our understanding of and the experimental literature on social influences on 
inhibitory control in early childhood, when inhibitory control develops most significantly, 
are limited. By moving beyond correlational research, the studies systematically 
examined important social cues that affect children’s developing inhibitory control 
abilities, which in turn not only advances the theoretical literature on children’s inhibitory 
control development, but also has implications for interventions and everyday practices. 
Much of the focus of existing interventions and practices rely heavily on verbal 
instruction and content. Although this may indeed be an important social cue, it is 
important to understand how other mechanisms whether explicit (demonstration of delay 
behavior) or implicit (mere presence) affect children’s inhibitory control and how 
children’s inhibitory control can be most effectively nurtured by their social context.  
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Chapter 2: The influence of adult’s conflicting verbal and behavioral information on 
children’s imitation of modeled self-control strategies and behavior 
Introduction 
Research suggests that children initially rely on their caregivers to aid in self-
control before they acquire the cognitive capacities to develop and employ their own 
strategies (Morris, Silk, Steinberg, Myers & Robinson, 2007). However, this literature 
has relied almost exclusively on correlational studies documenting the relation between 
parental characteristics (e.g., sensitivity, responsiveness) and children’s self-control 
(Doan, Fuller-Rowell, & Evans, 2012; Lee et al., 2008; von Suchodoletz, Trommsdorff, 
& Heikamp, 2011). A few studies have also looked specifically at strategies that children 
themselves use to self-regulate, concluding that attention deployment is particularly 
effective (Sethi, Mischel, Aber, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 2000). Building upon this work, 
other research suggests that strategy-focused direct instruction (thinking happy thoughts) 
influences children’s delay-of-gratification performance (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 
1972; Yates, Lippett, & Yates, 1981).  Despite the importance of strategy use and 
evidence that it can be transmitted, virtually no work has explored the teaching of these 
strategies and mechanisms by which children learn self-control from others (Fox & 
Calkins, 2003).  More importantly, little thus far has systematically examined the extent 
to which children imitate modeled strategies based on not only adults’ verbal 
information, but also their behavior.  
The literature on children’s learning and development has highlighted social 
learning and imitation as a crucial learning mechanism and yet the majority of this 
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research has focused on learning the conventional nature of tools (e.g., Carpenter, Akhtar, 
& Tomasello, 1998). As in the task of learning about novels tools, the act of self-
regulating is not directly intuitive and it is more feasible and efficient to turn to adult 
informants. While it would be expected that children would learn from imitation given 
that engaging in self-control is not immediately intuitive as the causal relation between 
regulatory behavior and outcome might be challenging to decipher.   
On the other hand, looking to adults to learn self-control strategies, in particular, 
can be difficult for young children. This is because adults may provide conflicting verbal 
and behavioral information. For example, parents may state the importance of not 
snacking before meals (the communicative intent), but then contradict their verbal intent 
by snacking before a meal  (the behavioral outcome). Under these situations, it is not 
clear whether young children prioritize an adult’s communicative intent or the outcome 
of her behavior. 
Furthermore, no research has explored children’s acquisition of self-control 
strategies in situations where verbal and behavioral information conflict, which are 
common in naturalistic contexts.  Moreover, whereas tool-use might be constrained to a 
specific tool, conventional knowledge should generalize beyond a particular situational 
context.  That is, children should be able to extend a strategy to a novel situation. 
 In the present study, I explored children’s use of two cues when learning self-
control strategies from an adult: their reliance on adult’s verbal instruction and their 
observation of outcomes. Children watched a model demonstrate self-control strategies in 
a delay-of-gratification task.  Crucially, the model’s communicative intent and successful 
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completion of the task (successful waiting) varied across children.  Across four between-
subjects conditions, the model either did or did not state the intention of waiting (positive 
v. negative communication) and then either did or did not succeed at the task (positive v. 
negative outcome).  I examined the extent to which children would imitate the strategies 
when engaging in a similar task and when generalizing the strategies to a novel context.   
I hypothesized that children would be more likely to succeed at a delay-of-
gratification task and imitate the self-control strategies observed when the model's verbal 
and behavioral information were consistent and positive, as opposed to when they were 
consistent and negative. Of interest was children’s strategy imitation after observing 
conflicting verbal and behavioral information. Some literature suggests that perceptual 
information – in this case, seeing the behavioral outcome in person – is more salient to 
children than other sources of information including verbal communication (Bandura & 
McDonald, 1963; Miller, Hardin, & Montgomery, 2003). By contrast, other research 
highlight’s children’s sensitivity to a model’s intention when determining what to learn 
(e.g., Harris, 2012; Liu, Vanderbilt & Heyman, 2013; Meltzoff, 1988). Thus, I also 
investigated whether verbal or behavioral information exerted more influence over 
children’s imitation of social conventions and performance on a self-control task. 
Finally, I hypothesized that children would be more likely to succeed at a novel 
self-control task and to generalize strategies when the model’s behavior and verbal 
information were consistent and positive.  I made no predictions as to children’s ability to 
generalize information from the familiar task to the novel task when verbal and 
behavioral information were in conflict.  
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In this study, children’s use of two cues when learning self-control strategies from 
an adult: their reliance on the adult’s verbal instruction, and their observation of 
successful outcomes were explored. Children were presented with an adult model who 
demonstrates self-regulatory strategies in a delay-of-gratification task.  Crucially, the 
model’s communicative intent and successful completion of the task varied across 
children.  Across four between-subjects conditions, the model either did or did not state 
the importance of completing the task (positive v. negative communication) and then 
either successfully waited or failed to wait (positive v. negative outcome).  The extent to 
which children imitated the strategies when engaging in a similar task, and when 
generalizing the learned strategies to a novel context was examined.   
It was hypothesized that children would be more likely to succeed at a delay-of-
gratification task and imitate the modeled self-control strategies when verbal and 
behavioral information are consistent and positive, as opposed to negative. Of interest 
was children’s strategy imitation after observing a conflict between verbal and behavioral 
information.  A large body of research on children’s overimitation suggests that children 
might privilege the model’s ostensive communicative signals – even at the expense of the 
desired outcome (e.g., Csibra & Gergley, 2009; Gergley et al., 2007; Meltzoff, 1988).  By 
contrast, some work on children’s understanding predicts that perceptual information – in 
this case, seeing the behavioral outcome, would be more salient than verbal 
communication (Miller, Hardin, & Montgomery, 2003).  
Finally, whether children are able to generalize learned self-control strategies to a 
novel context was also be examined. It is hypothesized that children are more likely to 
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succeed at a novel self-control task and are only able to generalize self-control strategies 
when the model’s behavior and verbal information are consistent.  
Method 
Participants. Eighty-four 4- to 5-year-old children (48 female) participated. All 
children participated with the consent of their parent, spoke English as their first 
language, and were recruited from local preschools. Eighty-two percent were identified 
by their parents as white; 14.3% Asian American; 2.4% African American; 1.2% 
Hispanic. Although information on socioeconomic status was not collected, the 
preschools serve a predominantly middle and upper-middle class population. 
Children were randomly assigned to 4 between-subjects conditions (n = 21 per 
group).  The mean age was 55.89 months (SD=5.77; 47-69 months). No age differences 
were found across the four conditions, F(1, 80) = .314, n.s. 
Materials. A White adult female served as the model.  For the delay-of-
gratification task, stickers (one small sticker vs. two larger stickers) served as incentives 
and a bell was used to notify the experimenter to end the wait. During the novel wait task, 
a box of toys was used (e.g., toy car, drawing pad, dolls).  Two other experimenters (E1 
& E2) interacted with the child.  E1 sat with the child and narrated the model’s actions.  
E2, blind to condition, interacted with the child in the familiar delay-of-gratification task, 
and the novel wait task. 
Procedure. 
Observation of Model.  To begin the task, children watched as the experimenter 
(E2) explained the delay task to the model, saying, “I have a sticker here. I need to leave 
	
	
27 
for a bit. If you wait until I come back, you can have this sticker and this big sticker. Two 
stickers! If you want to stop waiting, then ring the bell, and I will come back right away, 
but you will only get this one sticker.” Next, children watched as the model attempted to 
complete the task.     
In the Positive Communication-Positive Outcome condition, the model verbally 
expressed that she would self-regulate (“I should wait to get more stickers later”) and 
successfully completed the task (successfully waited until the experimenter returned).  
In two conditions, the model’s verbal and behavioral information conflicted. In 
the Positive Communication-Negative Outcome condition, the model verbally expressed 
that she would self-regulate, but did not complete the task (rang the bell). By contrast, in 
the Negative Communication-Positive Outcome condition, the model stated she would 
not self-regulate (“I shouldn’t wait so that I get this sticker now”), but then successfully 
waited until the experimenter returned.  
Finally, the Negative Communication-Negative Outcome, was used as a control 
for reflexive imitation. The model stated that she would not wait and then did not wait 
(rang the bell).   
In all conditions, the adult modeled two self-control strategies (singing a song, 
and pushing away the incentive followed by explicitly looking away from the incentive). 
After verbally expressing that she would/would not wait, the adult modeled each strategy 
for 30 seconds. Children watched the model with E1, who explicitly labeled the strategies 
used by the model (e.g., “Oh look, she’s singing a song. She’s singing a song to distract 
herself. When she’s singing a song she is not thinking about the sticker anymore”).  After 
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engaging in the strategies, the model either rang the bell, ending the task, or the 
experimenter appeared and stated that the model had successfully waited1.  
Familiar Delay-of-Gratification Task. Next, children were invited to complete the 
same task by E2. E2 repeated the instructions and left the room for five minutes, or until 
the child rang the bell. During the waiting period, the child was alone in the room and 
was video-recorded for subsequent coding of imitation of the modeled strategies, the 
frequency and duration of strategy use, and task outcome.   
Novel Wait Task. Following the familiar self-control task, children were taken to a 
different area of the room by E2 to complete a modified version of the Challenging Wait 
Task (Carmichael-Olson, Greenberg, & Slough, 1985). Children were shown a box of 
engaging toys and told to wait until the experimenter returned before playing with the 
toys. The task ended after five minutes, or when a participant touched one of the toys.  As 
in the familiar self-control task, strategy imitation, and task completion were video-
recorded and coded. 
Video Coding.   Videos were coded for children’s strategy imitation, frequency 
and duration of strategy use, and completion of the task. To determine children’s strategy 
imitation and completion of the task, I, blind to the condition of the child, coded all 
videos. A second coder coded 20% of videos. Inter-rater reliability was high (94% 
agreement, Cohen’s κ = .85). Disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
																																																								
1	To ensure that children could recall both the verbal and behavioral information from the 
model, in a pilot study, 16 children (M = 5;1, SD = 9 months) observed the model in one 
of 4 conditions, and were asked about her communicative intent and behavioral outcome 
(successful/unsuccessful waiting).  All children successfully recalled the model’s 
communicative intent, and 94% of children recalled the model’s behavioral outcome, 
suggesting that children were encoding both verbal and behavioral information.	
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Results 
Preliminary analyses indicated no significant association between gender and 
strategy use [χ2(1, 84)=.12, p =.73] or task completion [χ2(1, 84) = .44, p=.51] and no 
significant age differences (4- vs. 5-year-olds) in strategy use [χ2(1, 84)=.06, p=.81] or 
task completion [χ2(1, 84)=3.52, p =.06]. Thus, these variables were not included in 
subsequent analyses. 
Strategy imitation in the familiar self-regulation task 
Children received one point for each imitated strategy (max=2).  Table 2.1 
displays children’s total strategy imitation (out of 2) across each of the four conditions.  
Inspection of Table 1 indicates a similar pattern of imitation for children in the two 
Negative Outcome conditions, with most children not engaging in either strategy. By 
contrast, about half of the children in the two Positive Outcome conditions imitated at 
least one strategy.  
Table 2.1. Number of strategies (max = 2) participants imitated across conditions 
 Total Strategy Imitation 
Condition 0 1 2 N 
Positive-Communication—Positive Outcome 11  
(57.9%) 
7 
(33.3%) 
3 
(14.3%) 
21 
Positive Communication—Negative Outcome 19 
(90.5%) 
2 
(9.5%) 
0 
 
21 
Negative Communication—Positive Outcome 10 
(47.6%) 
6 
(28.6%) 
5 
(23.8%) 
21 
Negative Communication—Negative Outcome 16 
(76.2%) 
4 
(19.0%) 
1 
(4.8%) 
21 
 
To explore this difference in strategy imitation, a 2 Communication (Positive, 
Negative) x 2 Outcome (Positive, Negative) ANOVA was conducted on the number of 
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strategies imitated.  This analysis revealed a main effect of Outcome, F(1,80) = 12.71, 
p<.001, η2p=.14.  The main effect of Communication, F(1,80)=1.41, p=.24, was not 
significant, nor was the interaction between Communication and Outcome, F(1,80)=.03, 
p=.89, significant.  Nonparametric analyses confirmed this result: children were more 
likely to imitate the strategy after viewing a positive, as opposed to a negative outcome, 
Mann-Whitney U = 570.5, z= -3.35, p<.001.  By contrast, children were no more likely to 
imitate the strategies after hearing positive versus negative verbal communication, U = 
785, p=.30.  
The number of times each participant used the two novel strategies was also 
coded. Figure 2.1 displays the mean frequency of strategy use for each of the conditions 
(range 0-5 times).  Inspection of Figure 2.1 indicates that participants in the two Positive 
Outcome conditions had the highest means.  To explore this difference, we conducted a 2 
(Communication: Positive, Negative) x 2 (Outcome: Positive, Negative) ANOVA on the 
total number of times the strategies were used.  This analysis revealed a main effect of 
Outcome (F(1,80) =12.11, p<.001, η2p=.13).  The main effect of Communication, 
F(1,80)=1.05, p=.31, was not significant, nor was the interaction between 
Communication and Outcome, F(1,80)=.04, p=.84, significant.   
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Figure 2.1. Average number of times (standard error) participants used either of the two 
strategies during the task by condition.  
Familiar self-regulation task completion 
Table 2.2 shows the proportion of children who successfully waited during the 
familiar task by condition.  Inspection of Table 2.2 indicates that about 75% of the 
children in the Positive Outcome conditions successfully completed the task.  By 
contrast, only about 50% of the children in the Negative Outcome conditions completed 
the task. 
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Table 2.2. Number of children who successfully waited during the familiar task across 
conditions 
 
 Completion of Task 
Condition Rang Bell Waited N 
Positive-Communication—Positive Outcome 5 16 
(76.2%) 
21 
Positive Communication—Negative Outcome 9 12 
(57.1%) 
21 
Negative Communication—Positive Outcome 5 16 
(76.2%) 
21 
Negative Communication—Negative Outcome 10 11 
(52.4%) 
21 
 
To explore the relation between successfully waiting and model observation 
condition we conducted a logistic regression with Task Completion as the dependent 
variable and Outcome (positive, negative), Communication (positive, negative), and their 
interaction term as predictors. The final model included only the effect of Outcome 
(B=.97, SE = .48, χ2=4.32, p = .0385, -2Log Likelihood = 103.95, pseudo-R2=.05).  On 
average, the odds of successfully waiting during the familiar task were 2.64 times more 
likely if children observed a model exhibit positive, as opposed to negative behavior. 
A logistic regression was conducted to explore the relation between successful 
waiting and strategy imitation. Results indicated that strategy imitation was a significant 
predictor of task completion (B=1.35, SE = .61 χ2=5.87, p = .026, -2LL = 102.40, 
pseudo-R2=.07). On average, the odds of successfully waiting during the familiar task 
were 3.86 times more likely if the child imitated at least one of the strategies. 
Extension of learned strategies and successfully waiting during the novel task 
Lastly, children’s extension of self-control strategies to a novel situation was 
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explored. Overall, only 7% of participants used a learned strategy during the novel task—
and all of these participants were in the two Positive Outcome conditions (3 children in 
the Positive Communication-Positive Outcome condition, and 3 children in the Negative 
Communication-Positive Outcome condition).  Nonparametric analyses confirmed that 
children in the Positive Outcome conditions were more likely than children in the 
Negative Outcome conditions to extend the strategies to the novel task, χ2(1, 83) =6.63, 
p<.01.  
Furthermore, children who had used at least one strategy during the familiar task 
were more likely to extend the strategies to the novel task (B=1.74, SE = .90, χ2=3.98, 
p=.05, -2LL = 39.09, pseudo-R2=.05). On average, the odds of using a learned strategy 
during the novel task were 5.7 times more likely if the child had used at least one of the 
strategies during the familiar task. In addition, children who had successfully waited 
during the familiar task were significantly more likely to wait during the novel task 
(B=1.07, SE = .49, χ2=4.69, p =.03, -2LL = 97.59, pseudo-R2=.05). On average, the odds 
of successfully waiting during the novel task were 2.9 times more likely if the child had 
successfully waited during the familiar task. Note that these results should be interpreted 
with caution, given the low rate of strategy use in the novel task. 
Discussion 
 In this study, I investigated how children prioritize a model’s communicative 
intent and behavioral outcome when imitating self-control strategies and successfully 
completing a self-control task. I had hypothesized that children would be more likely to 
succeed at a delay-of-gratification task and imitate the self-control strategies when verbal 
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and behavioral information provided by the model was consistent and positive, as 
opposed to when the information was consistent and negative. Of interest was children’s 
strategy acquisition and success at the task when the model’s communicative intent and 
behavior were incongruent.  Overall, these data reveal that the model’s successful 
completion of the task was related to children’s task completion, imitation, and extension, 
whereas the model’s verbal intent was not. I discuss these findings, before addressing 
implications for educational intervention. 
 To my knowledge, this is the first study to compare children’s use of an 
informant’s communicative intent with the outcome of the informant’s behavior when 
engaging in imitative behavior.  Contrary to some literature highlighting the role of the 
model’s intentions on children’s learning (e.g., Liu et al., 2013; Meltzoff, 1988), the data 
suggest that children weight the outcome of the model’s actions greater than her intent 
when deciding to engage in imitation.  Indeed, children’s strategy imitation (frequency 
and duration) was related to outcome, with no significant effect of verbal communication 
in my analyses. 
Why would children ignore a model’s communicative intent when imitating novel 
conventions? First, it is plausible that the type of communication led to enhanced strategy 
encoding, but primed children’s background knowledge of strategies, which they may 
have chosen instead.  To explore this possibility, the videos were reviewed for instances 
of other strategy use (gaze aversion, self-talk, etc.).  No differences were found in other 
strategy use across conditions (F(3, 79) =.99, ns). Approximately 90% of participants 
engaged in some form of alternate strategy during the delay task.  
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In addition, I re-ran the logistic regression with alternate strategy use and found 
that alternate strategy use was not a significant predictor of task completion, B = 21.98, 
χ2=.00, ns. Thus, my data do not support the hypothesis that model communicative intent 
enhanced children’s employment of previously used strategies. 
An alternative possibility is that children used the model outcome to reappraise 
the effectiveness of the strategies they had previously witnessed.  On this hypothesis, 
children equally encode the strategies prior to the model outcome, regardless of model 
communicative intent. After viewing the successful or unsuccessful outcome, children 
implicitly decide whether or not to place the strategies in memory.  This is consistent 
with recent work showing that children are equally willing to imitate novel tool functions 
in the presence or absence of pedagogical cues (Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2010).  
Note that although my pilot work suggests that children had encoded both communicative 
intent and behavioral outcome immediately following the model’s demonstration, future 
research should assess children’s memory of the model’s strategies to determine if 
children in the negative outcome condition had indeed forgotten them after completing 
both the familiar and novel task.  Future work should also include measures of 
understanding mental states (theory of mind) and executive functioning, as both of these 
skills develop rapidly across the preschool years (e.g., Frith & Frith, 2005; Zelazo & 
Muller, 2002) and might impact children’s appraisal of the model’s communicative 
intent. That is, although all children might encode the model’s self-control strategies, 
sufficient executive functioning abilities might be necessary for children to be able to 
implement strategy-related behavior. Similarly, sufficient understanding of mental states 
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might be necessary for children to map the relationship between a model’s intentions and 
her subsequent behavior – especially in cases such as my current task where pedagogical 
cues are not explicit and when intentions and behavior are sometimes in conflict.  
Moreover, such variability in executive function and theory of mind might also account 
for the small percentage of children who extended the strategies to a novel task.  
Children’s successful completion of the task was related to whether or not they 
had viewed the model successfully complete the task.  This finding is consistent with 
Bandura’s Social Learning Theory (1977), as well as some recent empirical work 
highlighting the role of model behavior in children’s learning (Kenward, Karlsson, & 
Persson, 2010).  I anticipate that by modeling both strategies and outcomes, adults can 
increase the salience of the link between the two for young children.  
Moreover, my data suggest that some children learned beyond simple imitation of 
modeled strategies.  A subset of children was able to flexibly extend the strategies to a 
new context. All of these children were in conditions where they observed a positive 
outcome. This finding further highlights the relevance of outcome over pedagogical 
intent for children’s implementation of observed strategies. Although children’s learning 
of self-control behaviors was rather fragile – indeed the majority of children were unable 
to generalize the strategies across tasks – children were more likely to generalize 
strategies to a novel task when they had observed a positive outcome.  Future research 
should focus on the reason behind the low rate of transfer in my paradigm.  In addition to 
the role of executive function in mental state understanding in children’s ability to 
generalize, I anticipate that explicitly highlighting the causal relationship between 
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strategy use and successful completion of the task might increase the probability that 
children would extend the strategies in novel situations. 
I suggest that these findings have implications for understanding how children 
acquire strategies in explicit or indirect teaching contexts where pedagogical intent and 
behavioral outcome may conflict. For the most part, interventions and everyday parental 
instruction often include discussion and modeling of effective strategies, but at present, 
less attention is paid to modeling the outcome of strategy use. The results of the current 
study suggest that observation of a successful outcome is crucial when encoding novel 
conventions, and for some children, when extending those novel conventions to new 
situations.  The efficacy of interventions could be improved by not merely teaching 
children the importance of self-regulation and how to self-regulate via verbal instruction 
and explanation, but also by actively demonstrating that these strategies are indeed 
effective. In summary, my findings highlight a striking difference between the 
importance of pedagogical intent and model outcome in children’s acquisition and use of 
novel social conventions, one which I believe provides notable implications for 
successful instruction.  
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Chapter 3: The influence of model’s social group status on children’s imitation of self-
control strategies and behavior 
Introduction 
The results from Chapter 2 indicate that preschool children can acquire novel self-
control strategies from an adult via observation and imitation. Specifically, what was 
found to drive the learning of modeled strategies was the model’s demonstration of their 
own successful self-control highlighting children’s reliance on information provided by 
others to selectively determine from whom and what to learn. In Chapter 3, I explore 
another potentially important social cue: the model’s characteristics. Research on adults 
has shown that adults favor informants who are similar to themselves along multiple 
dimensions, including shared social group membership (Ryu, Park, & Feick, 2006). 
Social categories, gender, race, and age, have been found to be particularly salient and 
influential in social contexts (Brewer, 1988; Fiske, 1998).  Studies have shown that 
children also demonstrate preferences based on these categories (Aboud, 1988, Alexander 
and Hines, 1994, Baron and Banaji, 2006, French, 1984, Katz and Kofkin, 1997, Kircher 
and Furby, 1971, Kowalski and Lo, 2001; Quintana & McKown, 2008; Maccoby and 
Jacklin, 1987; Ruble, Martin, & Berenbaum, 2006). In this chapter, I focus on whether 
White and Asian American preschool-age children encode the race of a model 
spontaneously in learning of delay behavior and strategies.  
Research suggests that category-based social preferences develop early and 
indicate early preferences for people with familiar characteristics (Kinzler & Spelke, 
2011). This preference for familiar social others is evident from infancy. Kelly et al. 
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(2005) found that Caucasian infants looked longer at faces of their own race compared to 
African, Chinese, or Middle Eastern faces. Bar-Haim, Ziv, Lamy & Hodes (2006) 
extended this study and found a cross-race visual preference in Israeli and Ethiopian 
infants finding that Ethiopian infants in Africa looked longer at own-race (Black) faces 
than at other-race (White) face. Another study found that the visual preference for own 
ethnic group also applied to Chinese infants. Chinese 3-month-old infants demonstrated 
preference for faces from their own ethnic group (Kelly et al., 2007). These findings 
highlight the early developmental origins of racial categorization that while may not be 
present at birth start to develop by 3 months of age (Kelly et al., 2007).  
Furthermore, social preferences based on race are said to emerge as early as 2.5 
years of age (Kinzler & Spelke, 2011) and more reliably closer to 4 or 5 years of age 
(Aboud, 2003). Moreover, there is strong evidence that by 4-5 years of age, children 
attend to race when “classifying, evaluating, and reasoning about other individuals in a 
variety of tasks and contexts” (as cited in Shutts et al. 2010; Aboud, 1988; Aboud & 
Skerry, 1984; Bigler & Liben, 2006; Quintana & McKown, 2008 as cited in Shutts, 
Banaji, & Spelke, 2010). Kircher and Furby (1971) found in their study that only the 4- 
and 5-year-old, not the 3-year-old, children demonstrated reliable preferences based on 
race information. This apparent developmental progression of race-based social 
preferences was examined in a more recent study by Kinzler and Spelke (2011). The 
study found that race-based social preferences was not observed in 10-month old and 2.5- 
year old children, but that 5- and 6-year-old children expressed race-based social 
preferences, and preferred individuals of their own race almost unanimously. Dunhan, 
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Baron, and Carey (2011) also found clear ingroup preferences among their 5-year-olds 
participants. Ingroup preferences have also been found to influence preschool children’s 
resource distribution, with children being more generous to ingroup members 
(Buttlemann & Bohm, 2014), as well as friendships, preferring to be friends with other 
children of their own race (Kowalski & Lo, 2001).  
Together, these studies demonstrate that by 4- and 5 years of age, children not 
only develop more awareness for racial differences (Clark & Clark, 1947; Goodman, 
1952) and better recognition of physical characteristics that distinguish racial group 
membership, but they also tend to express clear biases in favor of specific groups 
(Degner & Wentura, 2010), especially their own. In fact, young children can also hold 
negative attitudes toward members of ethnic or racial groups other than their own 
(Aboud, 2003; Aboud, 1987; Aboud & Skerry, 1984; Bigler, 1995; Bigler & Liben, 1992; 
Nesdale, 2001; Powlishta, Serbin, Doyle, & White, 1994; Yee & Brown, 1994). For 
example, 5-year-olds are more likely to attribute negative traits to outgroup members as 
compared to members of their social ingroup (Aboud, 2003).  
How would this preference for the in-group affect children’s learning of novel 
delay strategies from an in-group or out-group model?  Early research suggested that a 
child’s willingness to imitate a model is dependent on his or her ascribed and/or actual 
similarity to the model learning and that these similarities can be based on personality 
traits (Kagan, 1967), language (Buttleman, Zmyj, Daum & Carpenter, 2012; general 
background and interests (Rosekrans, 1967; Stotland & Patchen, 1961; Stotland, Zander, 
& Natsoulas, 1962), gender (Ehrenberg, Goldhaber, & Brewer, 1994; Grusec & Brinker, 
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1975; Maccoby & Wilson, 1957), and shared life experiences (Martup & Coates, 1967). 
In addition to these perceived similarities, Bandura (1969) argued that learning occurs 
when there is racial and/or cultural similarity between a learner and teacher/model.  
However, research on the role of group membership on young children’s selective 
imitation not only has yielded mixed findings, but have focused primarily on cues like 
language and accent (Krieger, Moller, Zymj & Aschersleben, 2016; Kinzler et al., 2009; 
Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2011; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Kinzler & DeJesus, 2013), 
and not as much on race as indicated by physical appearance. Buttleman et al. (2012) 
found that 14-month-old infants after watching an adult tell a story and demonstrate a 
novel action (imitation task) and choose 1 of 2 objects (preference task) either in their 
native language (ingroup) or a foreign language (outgroup), while did not show 
selectivity in the preference task, imitated the ingroup model more faithfully than the 
outgroup model. Howard et al. (2015) explored whether this in-group preference varies 
by learning contexts (live or video-recorded action demonstration). They found that 19-
month-old infants did not selectively imitate the actions of the linguistic in-group model 
(English speaking) in live contexts, but such preferences were found after having 
observed the model on video. On the other hand, three-year-old children were more likely 
to imitate the actions of a linguistic in-group model than the actions of an out-group 
model (Spanish speaking) in both learning contexts. These studies while they focused on 
language as a basis of group membership, revealed that even from infancy group 
affiliation can significantly affect imitative behavior.  
Oostenbroek and Over (2015) found that preschool-aged children, especially 5-
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year-olds, also demonstrated ingroup preferences within a social learning context. In their 
study, children drew a token (either yellow or green) to be assigned to a yellow group or 
a green group and was asked to wear a scarf and wristband reflecting the color of his or 
her group. They were shown two possible ways to operate a novel light box and then 
presented with a video in which three individuals demonstrated one of the ways to 
operate the box. While both 4- and 5-year-old children demonstrated a significant 
difference in imitative behavior between out-group and neutral conditions, the evidence 
for contrastive behavior was stronger in the 5-year-olds. Their findings revealed that 
these children did not simply ignore the out-group, but behaviorally distanced themselves 
from out-group members, contrasting significantly more often than they matched their 
behavior to the out-group. Oostenbroek and Over (2015) concluded that the 5-year-old 
children did not merely show in-group preferences but reacted to the behavior of the out-
group. However, while this study highlighted children’s sensitivity to group membership, 
it used arbitrary social categories and thus it is not clear the extent to which children 
would demonstrate this in-group preference based on race. Furthermore, given that this 
study used verbal labeling to make the social categories salient to children, whether 
children would encode group membership spontaneously, namely the race of the model 
also needed to be addressed.   
Shutts et al. (2010) explored various dimensions of social group membership to 
determine whom young children look to when deciding their own preferences. 
Importantly, they sought to find which social categories are activated and used 
spontaneously. Three-year-old children saw pairs of photographs of people who 
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presented with social category distinctions of gender (male, female) and race (White, 
Black) in Experiment 1 or gender and age (child, adult) in Experiment 2 accompanied by 
audio clips in which each person endorsed a different novel toy, food, game, or clothing 
item, and then were asked which object or activity they preferred themselves. The social 
categories were neither labeled nor highlighted. Their findings revealed that the children 
did not consistently view others’ race as a particularly meaningful guide for preferences. 
Rather, gender and age were shown to be more powerful guides to preferences than race 
at this age. However, Shutts et. al (2010) identified that older children may demonstrate a 
different performance profile. Indeed, research suggest that children 4-5 years of age 
demonstrate more reliable preferences and decisions about their own preferences and 
their encoding of others’ behavior based on race information (Kircher & Furby, 1971; 
Bennett & Sani, 2003). Furthermore, the study sample was White and from fairly 
homogenous environments and therefore the extent to which these findings apply to 
children from minority groups is unclear.  
A more recent study by Krieger et al. (2016) examined children’s spontaneous use 
of race indicated solely by physical appearance, and not other cues such as language or 
accent. Specifically, 4-year-old German children observed a German model and a 
Chinese model perform novel manual actions. The results showed that the children did 
not imitate more action steps after having observed the German model compared to the 
Chinese model. However, questions still remain regarding how these findings extend to 
children from minority backgrounds and to the context of learning self-regulatory 
strategies. 
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Although the research reviewed above presents mixed findings, generally findings 
points to the importance of group membership, and potentially the race of the model, on 
4- and especially 5-year-old children’s imitative behavior. Dee (2004) found in his 
longitudinal study, that both black and white students in grades K-3 showed improved 
test scores after they were randomly assigned to a racially similar teacher, suggesting that 
both minority and majority children benefited from learning from a racial ingroup 
teacher. Therefore, I might anticipate a similar pattern between my Caucasian and Asian 
participants, with both racial groups displaying greater imitation of outcome and 
individual strategies when learning from a racial ingroup model.  
An alternative hypothesis is that we might see differential effects of racial ingroup 
depending on the racial group status of the learner. A growing body of research not only 
suggests that minority students could benefit from having teachers who are of their own 
race/ethnicity (Egalite, Kisida & Winters, 2015; Dee, 2004; Oates, 2003), but that racial 
congruence may matter more for minority learners than for majority group students 
(Oates, 2003). Based on these data, Asian-American children might display a greater 
sensitivity to the racial group of the model than Caucasian children. Nevertheless, this 
body of work should be interpreted with caution for two reasons. First, most of the 
research conducted on teacher-student racial/ethnic match has been descriptive rather 
than experimental and have focused on teachers’ perception of students, not students’ 
perception of teachers, based on race. Second, the research has only considered 
differences between White and Black students and teachers (Yiu, 2013). Thus, it is 
unclear whether the same hypothesized differences between racial/ethnic match would 
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apply to Asian-American children. 
Finally, it may also be hypothesized that Caucasian children would be more 
sensitive to the social group status of the model than Asian American children given 
research that suggests that children’s in-group preferences based on race are stronger for 
majority-race children than for minority-race children (Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble & 
Fuligni, 2001). This is suggested to be due to the relative status that various racial groups 
hold in society (Cameron et al., 2001). Some explain that minority children are less likely 
to shown an ingroup preference because of the conflict between the positive attitudes 
they have toward their own group versus what the majority culture’s devaluation of their 
group (Spencer & Markstrom-Adams, 1990 as cited in Cameron et al., 2001). Others 
suggest that because racial minority children develop cognitive flexibility from the 
challenge of identifying with both their own group and White society; therefore, they 
argue that minority children do not exhibit ingroup biases to the extent of majority 
children and may in fact value and adopt ingroup characteristics and activities 
(Alejandro-Wright, 1985; Cross, 1985; Cameron et al., 2001).  
In this study, I investigated whether racial group membership of the model 
influenced 4- and 5-year-old children’s imitation of delay strategies. Caucasian and 
Chinese American children were randomly assigned to either observe a Caucasian or an 
East Asian model perform a delay-of-gratification task, during which she demonstrated 
novel self-regulatory strategies to help her wait. The extent to which children imitated the 
strategies when engaging in a similar task was examined and whether they successfully 
completed the task.  
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Method 
Participants. Forty-seven Chinese-American (M=59.18 months, 23 females) and 
39 Caucasian-American (M=56.59 months, 21 females) 4- to 5-year-old children 
participated in this study. Children were randomly assigned to either observe an East 
Asian or Caucasian American model. There were 21 Chinese American who observed a 
Caucasian model and 26 who observed an East Asian American model; 20 Caucasian 
American children observed an East Asian American model and 19 observed a Caucasian 
American model. No age differences were found across these conditions, F(1, 81) = .498, 
n.s. Children were recruited from local preschools and daycares. Children needed to 
understand English in order to participate.  
Materials. A White or an East Asian American adult female served as the model.  
For the delay-of-gratification task, stickers (1 small sticker vs. 2 larger stickers) were 
used as incentives and a bell was used to notify the experimenter to end the wait. Two 
other experimenters interacted with the child. E1 sat with the child and narrated the 
model’s actions. E2, blind to condition, interacted with the child in the familiar delay-of-
gratification task.  
Procedure. 
Observation of Model. Participants were randomly assigned to either observe a 
model who was Caucasian American or East Asian American perform a delay-of-
gratification task. E2 explained the delay task to the model, saying, “I have a sticker here. 
I need to leave for a bit. If you wait until I come back, you can have this sticker and this 
big sticker. Two stickers! If you want to stop waiting, then ring the bell, and I will come 
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back right away, but you will only get this one sticker.” Next, children watched as the 
model attempted to complete the task. The model first stated her intent to wait then 
engaged in two self-regulatory strategies (pushing away the incentive, singing a song) for 
30 seconds each. E1 who sat next to the child observing the model together explicitly 
labeled the strategies used by the model. After engaging in the strategies, the 
experimenter appeared and stated that the model had successfully waited.  
Familiar Self-regulation Task. Next, children were invited to complete the same 
task by E2. E2 repeated the instructions and left the room for five minutes, or until the 
child rang the bell. During the waiting period, the child was alone in the room and was 
video-recorded for subsequent coding of imitation of the modeled strategies, the 
frequency of strategy use, and task outcome.   
Video Coding.   Videos were coded for children’s strategy imitation and 
completion of the task. 
Social Group Identification Task. Forty of the 46 Chinese American children 
completed a brief non-standardized measure, adapted from Chen, Corriveau, and Harris 
(2009), to probe children’s sensitivity to social group differences. Children were shown 
two sets of photographs, one set including an image of a Caucasian woman and an image 
of a Chinese woman, and the other set, an image of a Caucasian man and an image of a 
Chinese woman, and were asked a series of questions about the photographs (see Figure 
3.1). The experimenter presented and pointed to the first set of photographs, asking a 
social group recognition question, “Do these girls/boys look different from one another?” 
If the child responded positively, the experimenter then asked “What differences do you 
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see?” and the differences that were pointed out by the participant were recorded. The 
experimenter also asked a social group identification question. Indicating in random 
order: “Do you think you are more like this girl/boy over here or like this girl/boy over 
here, or neither one of them?” These questions were then repeated after presenting the 
child with the second set of photographs. Approximately 77% percent of the children 
reported that they recognized a difference between the two photographs and 65% of the 
children reported that they identified with either or both the Chinese man or woman. The 
remaining 35% either identified with at least one of the Caucasian adults or with neither 
the Caucasian or Asian individual. To examine whether social group identification 
influenced children’s learning from an ingroup versus an outgroup model, I ran a two 
way ANOVA with total strategies imitated as the outcome Model Race (Caucasian, 
Asian) and Social Group Identification (Identified with racial ingroup, Did not identify 
with racial ingroup model) as predictors. While there was a significant main effect of 
Model Race, F(1, 36) = 4.53, p = .04, no other main effects or interactions were 
significant, suggesting that the effect of Model Race on the average number of strategies 
did not vary by Social Group Identification.    
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Figure 3.1. Photographs used for the Social Group Identification Task 
Results  
There were no differences based on gender or preschool population on strategy 
imitation or task completion in preliminary analyses, and so these variables were not 
included in subsequent analyses.  
Social group affiliation and strategy imitation  
First, I examined the relationship between social group affiliation and whether or 
not a child imitated a strategy. Inspection of Figure 3.2 indicates that Caucasian-
American, but not Chinese-American children, were significantly more likely to imitate if 
the model was a social ingroup member.  
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Figure 3.2. Proportion of children who imitated at least one strategy by race of child and 
race of the model.  
To explore this relationship further, a logistic regression was conducted with 
children’s imitation of at least one strategy as the outcome and Child Race (Caucasian, 
Asian) and Model Race (Caucasian, Asian) as predictors. Results revealed a significant 
Child Race x Model Race interaction, B =-2.22, SE = .96, Wald χ 2 (1) = 5.29, p =.021. 
Caucasian children were 1.16 times more likely to imitate a modeled strategy if they had 
observed a Caucasian versus an Asian model. Asian children were .83 times more likely 
to imitate a modeled strategy if they had observed a Caucasian versus an Asian model.  
I then explored the effect of social group affiliation on the average number of 
strategies imitated. Children received one point for each imitated strategy (max=2).  
Table 3.1 displays children’s total strategy imitation (out of 2) by child’s race and 
model’s race.  Inspection of Table 3.1 reveals a preference for a racial ingroup model, 
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with more children imitating one or more of the strategies on average when they had 
observed an ingroup model versus an outgroup model, with Caucasian children 
demonstrating a stronger ingroup preference.  
Table 3.1. Number of strategies (max = 2) participants imitated across conditions 
 Condition Total Strategy Imitation 
Child Race  0 1 2 N 
Caucasian 
American  
Caucasian American Model 8 
(44.4%) 
8 
(44.4%) 
2 
(11.1%) 
18 
Asian American Model 16 
(80.0%) 
2 
(10.0%) 
2 
(10.0%) 
20 
Chinese 
American  
Caucasian American Model 15 
(71.4%) 
6 
(28.6%) 
0 
(0%) 
21 
Asian American Model 15 
(57.7%) 
7 
(26.9%) 
4 
(15.4%) 
26 
 
 To explore this difference in number of strategies imitated, I conducted a 2 Child 
Race (Caucasian, Asian) x 2 Model Race (Caucasian, Asian) ANOVA on the number of 
strategies imitated. This analysis revealed a significant interaction, F(1,81)=5.25, p=.025. 
Main effects of Child Race or Model Race were not significant. To explore this 
interaction further, nonparametric analyses were conducted. Results indicated a 
significant difference of average number of strategies imitated between Caucasian 
children who had observed a Caucasian model (M=.67) and those who had observed an 
Asian model (M=.30), Mann-Whitney, U=122.00, z=-1.99, p=.047. On the other hand, 
there was no significant difference in average number of strategies imitated between 
Asian children who had observed an Asian model (M=.58) and those who had observed a 
Caucasian model (M=.29), Mann-Whitney, U=223.50, z=-1.25, p=.211.  
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Social group affiliation and task completion 
Finally, I explored the effect of social group affiliation on children’s task 
completion. Table 3.2 shows the proportion of children who successfully waited during 
the delay task by condition.  Inspection of Table 2.2 indicates that 80% of Caucasian and 
Chinese American children completed the task for ingroup and outgroup model 
conditions.  
Table 3.2. Number of children who successfully waited across conditions 
 
The results from a logistic regression with children’s task completion as the 
outcome and Child Race (Caucasian, Asian) and Model Race (Caucasian, Asian) as 
predictors revealed no significant findings. There was no significant main effect for either 
Child Race, B =-.194, SE = .794, Wald χ 2 (1) = .060, p =.807, or Model Race, B =.-.061, 
SE = .748, Wald χ 2 (1) = .007, p =.935, and no significant Child Race x Model Race 
interaction, B = .194, SE = 1.092, Wald χ 2 (1) = .032, p =.859. 
Finally, as in the previous study, I explored the relation between strategy imitation 
and task completion. Table 3.3 presents the number and percentage of participants who 
completed the task if they imitated or did not imitate at least one strategy during the delay 
  Completion of Task 
Child Race Condition Rang Bell Waited N 
Caucasian 
American 
Caucasian American Model 4 15 
(78.9%) 
19 
 Asian American Model 4 16 
(80.0%) 
20 
Chinese  
American 
Caucasian American Model 4 17 
(81.1%) 
21 
 Asian American Model 5 20 
(80.0%) 
25 
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task. Almost all of the participants who imitated a strategy completed the task. A logistic 
regression was conducted with task completion as the outcome and Strategy Imitation 
(Imitated, Did not imitate) as a predictor. Strategy imitation was a significant predictor of 
successful task completion, B=2.50 SE = 1.06, Wald χ2=5.57, p = .018, -2LL = 74.40, 
pseudo-R2=.115. On average, the odds of successfully waiting were 12.21 times as likely 
if the child imitated at least one of the strategies.  
Table 3.3. Strategy imitation and task completion 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
In this study, I investigated children’s spontaneous encoding of the model’s race 
and its effect on their imitation of novel self-regulatory strategies. I had hypothesized 
given the extant literature on group membership and children’s imitative behavior, that 
participants, regardless of their race, would demonstrate in-group preferences, and that 
this preference would be stronger for the Chinese American children. However, the 
results from the study revealed a trend but not a significant difference among Chinese 
American children in their preference for racial ingroup or outgroup status of the model 
when learning self-regulatory skills. Instead, I found a significant difference in strategy 
imitation between ingroup and outgroup conditions for Caucasian American 
preschoolers.  
 Completion of Task 
Strategy Imitation Rang Bell Waited N 
Imitated Strategy 1 29 
(96.7%) 
30 
Did not Imitate Strategy 16 39 
(70.9%) 
55 
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To my knowledge, this is the first study to examine the role of model group 
membership on imitative behavior in not only the context of learning self-regulatory 
strategies, but also in minority populations. As shown in previous studies, my findings 
confirm that preschool-aged children tend to show ingroup preferences when imitating 
novel actions. My study, however, extends prior research by examining not only 
Caucasian children, but also children from minority backgrounds, specifically, Chinese 
American children.  
Contrary to my hypothesis, Chinese American children who had observed a same 
race model were neither significantly more likely to imitate nor did they imitate 
significantly more of the strategies on average, than those who had observed a Caucasian 
model. On the other hand, I found that Caucasian American children were almost twice 
more likely to imitate a modeled strategy and imitated significantly more of the strategies 
on average when they had observed a Caucasian model versus an Asian model. While 
this may seem contradictory to the body of work that suggests that children from minority 
backgrounds benefit more from learning from a same race teacher than their counterparts 
from a majority background, there are several empirically-based explanations for these 
findings.  
First, research suggests that children’s in-group preferences based on race are 
grounded in their preferences for the familiar (Cameron et al., 2001). This provides one 
explanation as to why majority-race children would demonstrate a stronger in-group 
preference based on race than minority-race children.  For example, one study found that 
Ethiopian infants born in Israel who had been exposed to both Caucasians and Africans 
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looked equally to Black and White faces (Bar-Haim, Ziv, Lamy & Hodes, 2006; Kelly et 
al., 2005). Feinman and Entwisle (1976) found that African American children were 
better at recognizing Caucasian faces than Caucasian children were at recognizing 
African American faces. These findings highlight the mediating role of differential 
exposure on visual preference for same-race faces (Kelly et al., 2007; Brigham & 
Malpass, 1985). Children from minority backgrounds may have more contact with people 
of other races than Caucasians do. In turn, this may explain why I found differential 
effects on racial group status of the model between Caucasian and Chinese American 
children, with Caucasian children demonstrating a stronger in-group preference. 
Second, although Chinese American children did not demonstrate significant in-
group preferences, when examined by age, in-group preferences were more salient.  For 
the five-year-old Chinese American children, there was a trend for those who observed a 
racial ingroup model imitating more of the strategies on average than children who 
observed an outgroup model, Mann-Whitney U = 40.00, z= -1.77, p=.08.  There were no 
significant or near significant findings for the four-year-olds Mann-Whitney U = 51.00, 
z= -.809, p=.42. This is consistent with previous research, which reveals mixed findings 
for young children ages three and four (Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Shutts et al., 
2010), but more consistent and robust findings of in-group preferences among 5-year-
olds (Aboud, 2003; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Oostenbroek & Over, 2015). Some 
studies have even shown that 5 but not 4-year-olds take into account the race of the 
model in their imitative behavior. In fact, this pattern was also evident among the 
Caucasian sample as well, although there were no significant findings due to the small 
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sample size. Given these findings, future research could investigate the developmental 
progression of the effect of model’s group membership and whether it becomes more 
pronounced with age.  
The results from this study highlight 4- and 5-year-olds tendency to imitate an in-
group model over an out-group model when learning self-regulatory skills. Because self-
regulatory strategies resemble social conventions, the cultural and social group status of 
the model may have been especially important in strategy acquisition. Interestingly, we 
found that the racial group membership of the model had more of an influence on 
Caucasian children than the Chinese American children, which is consistent with research 
that suggest that in-group preferences are stronger among majority-race children than 
minority-race children. Nonetheless, when examined by age, racial group preference was 
more salient for the 5-year-olds than 4-year-olds for both groups of children.  
The study could have examined further the cultural backgrounds and 
demographics of the participants to identify potential factors that may have moderated the 
effect of social group status of the model on children’s imitative behavior. For instance, 
even among Chinese American populations there is great diversity due to acculturation 
level and immigration status, as well as their educational history. Future research should 
also explore other markers of group membership such as language, which some studies 
indicate is a more powerful basis for social categorization than race in the preschool years 
(Kinzler & Spelke, 2011). In fact, a more recent study also suggested based on their 
findings that language is necessary to highlight group membership in 4-year-olds for 
there to be group-specific imitative behavior in children. This may be one reason as to 
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why my findings demonstrated differential effects of group membership between 4- and 
5-year-olds imitative behavior. Other markers of group membership that could be 
examined are gender, which also has been shown to significantly influence children’s 
imitative behaviors and preferences for unfamiliar or novel objects (Bussey & Bandura, 
1984; Grace, David & Ryan, 2008; Perry & Bussey, 1979) and even shared interests, 
which to my knowledge has not been examined yet. Furthermore, future research could 
also explore the interplay among these various markers of group membership. 
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CHAPTER 4: Developmental differences in the effect of an image of eyes on children’s 
inhibitory control performance  
 
Introduction 
As the prior studies demonstrate, inhibitory control can be affected through top-
down processes such as adult’s modeled behavior and even the adult’s race. At the same 
time, bottom-up processes can also influence children’s inhibitory control. The following 
studies will focus on another aspect of inhibitory control, interference control, which 
involves inhibition at the cognitive level (selective attention and executive control). 
According to the Social Baseline Theory, the presence of others can help individuals 
conserve important and often metabolically costly somatic and neural resources for self-
regulation (Beckes & Coan, 2011). Even just the gaze of others is a powerful social cue 
that conveys information about attention and emotional and mental states. People have an 
innate strong sensitivity to being gazed at by others (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 
2002; Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007) and research demonstrates that mere passive 
gaze of another can facilitate or undermine the ability to inhibit a habitual or reactive 
response in favor of a subdominant response (inhibitory control) (Marino et al., 2015). 
While there are various explanations for this effect including physiological arousal, 
evaluation apprehension, perceptions of challenge or threat (e.g., Zajonc, 1965, 
Baumeister, 1982; Blascovitch, Mendes, Hunter, & Saloman, 1999), it is uniformly 
agreed that the perception of the co-presence of another person and being “watched” is 
important to producing social facilitation effects.  
More recently, studies have shown that the perception of being watched can be 
produced by just a picture of eyes or an eyelike stimulus. For example, Haley and Fessler 
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(2005) found that participants who played the economic game with schematic eye stimuli 
on their computer screen chose to share more money with their fellow participants than 
those participants whose computer backdrop had no eyes present. The increased 
economic fairness and collaboration presumably resulted from the feeling of being 
watched. Importantly, this feeling of being watched was elicited by mere “eyespots” on 
the computer background. Not only have these findings been replicated in subsequent 
studies, but also more recently, the effect of an image of eyes (angry eyes) has been 
shown to increase cooperative behavior in naturalistic settings. Bateson et al. (2006) 
found that when people were in the presence of a picture of angry eyes versus an equal-
sized picture of flowers they contributed significantly more to charity. They presented a 
strong theoretical framework to argue that the (“photocopied”) eye cues, although “very 
weak, subconscious cues” evoked the “psychology of being watched” and thereby 
significantly enhanced cooperation (Bateson et al., 2006, p. 413).  According to Rigdon et 
al. (2009), the “watching eyes,” automatically activates the cognitive representations of 
being watched by others. This process, which they argue, is so fully ingrained into 
unconscious social cognition that it can be set off by even a weak social stimulus, such as 
a visual stimulus representing watching eyes.  
However, the effect of such a minimal social cue on inhibitory control, more 
specifically interference control, has yet to be examined. The flanker task (Eriksen & 
Erkisen, 1974) is one of the most widely used measures of inhibition of prepotent 
responses. It entails identifying the central object while ignoring competing objects on 
each side. When these flanking objects differ from the central target, people are less 
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accurate and respond more slowly, which is referred to as flanker interference (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974). Therefore, response speed and accuracy on this task can provide crucial 
information on selective attention and executive control. However, the most general 
finding using this task is that responses become slower under high conflict demands as 
compared to low- or nonconflict ones. This extra time is thought to reflect the time 
consumed by the operation of an executive attentional mechanism task. Consequently, 
the speed of response is viewed as indicative of efficiency of response (McMorris, 2016).  
The following studies will use the Flanker task as a means to examine children’s 
cognitive inhibitory control, with a focus on executive control performance, which entails 
both conflict resolution and inhibitory control.  
Moreover, although there have been studies that looked at the role of gaze 
direction signals on inhibitory control performance, there is a lack of research on the 
effect of a mere image of eyes although such stimuli have garnered interest in the fields 
of social psychology and social cognition. Studies have demonstrated that minimal social 
presence as in the form of passive or implied evaluative presence can have a facilitative 
or inhibitive effect on cognitive performance, but as Allport (1954) posited, social 
influence can be experienced even in the absence of the actual physical presence of others 
(Allport, 1954; Blascovich, 2002). Therefore, in the following two studies, I examined 
whether a mere image of eyes can significantly facilitate and/or inhibit inhibitory control 
on a Flanker task and variables that could mediate this effect.  
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Study 3: Developmental differences in the effect of an image of eyes on children’s 
inhibitory control performance 
Recent studies have shown that gaze encoding and cueing are not completely 
reflexive, but depend in part on socio-cognitive variables. For example, mental state 
attribution and beliefs about the minds of others can influence how we process, select 
relevant information and orient to it (e.g., Teufel et al., 2010; Wiese et al., 2012; 
Wykowska et al., 2014; Gobel et al., 2015; Richardson & Gobel, 2015). The ability to 
understand others’ mental states is referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM). Humans infer 
the mental states of others through the perception of various social cues such as gaze, 
facial expressions, and emotion recognition (Byom & Mutlu, 2013). In fact, some 
research suggests that gaze processing is intrinsically linked to theory of mind (Baron-
Cohen, 1995). Children with autism who have impaired ToM for example, have been 
shown to be not as sensitive to social cues (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Firth, 1985) and have 
more difficulty recognizing more complex emotional stimuli involving the perception of 
faces or part of faces, particularly eye gaze (Castelli, 2005). 
Even among preschool-aged children, children’s theory of mind abilities may 
vary. For instance, five-year-olds may generally have a more fully developed theory of 
mind than four-year-olds who may not have fully developed the ability to form 
representations of others’ mentalistic and emotional states (Wellman & Liu, 2004).  More 
specifically, research indicates that at around age 4 children begin to acknowledge false 
beliefs of other people, and typically by age 5, children are not only more likely to 
answer false belief questions with consummate ease (Flavell, 1999; Wellman, 2002), but 
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also display sophisticated understanding of emotions (Rieffe, Terwogt, & Cowan, 2005).  
In fact, research suggests that theory of mind is a significant predictor of emotion 
recognition ability in preschoolers (Rosenqvist, Nuuttila, Laasonen & Korkman, 2013). 
Therefore, given the developmental progression of theory of mind ability in early 
childhood, it is plausible that as preschool aged children’s theory of mind abilities vary so 
in turn will their sensitivity to social cues and stimuli. 
Taken together, it is likely that children with underdeveloped ToM may not 
interpret the eyes as social let alone the nuances of its social cues, and therefore might not 
be as affected by their presence. Therefore, it could be hypothesized that children’s 
developing theory of mind is related to children’s sensitivity and encoding of social 
presence (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), which in turn 
can affect the influence of social stimuli on inhibitory control performance.  
The following studies will address not only the larger gap in the literature 
regarding the effect of minimal social cue, specifically an image of watching eyes, on 
children’s inhibitory control, but will extend this question further by exploring potential 
mediating variables, namely children’s developmental level and the emotional valence of 
the stimulus. In Study 3a, using the picture of angry eyes and a picture of flowers that 
were used in the original study of minimal social presence by Bateson et al. (2006), I first 
examined possible differences in inhibitory control performance by how children 
performed on an inhibitory control task in the presence of a social stimulus (Angry Eyes) 
versus a non-social stimulus (Flowers). Given that children’s ability to understand the 
mental and emotional states of others affects children’s sensitivity to social cues, I 
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examined whether the effect of image of eyes on inhibitory control varied by ToM 
ability. Then in Study 3b, I examined the role of emotional valence of the social stimulus 
on children’s inhibitory control by including an additional social stimulus (Happy Eyes) 
to the procedure.  
For Study 3a, it was hypothesized that children with less developed ToM ability 
will not be as affected by the social stimulus and will therefore show little if any 
difference in inhibitory control performance between the social-object condition and the 
non-social object condition. On the other hand, it was hypothesized that children with 
more advanced ToM ability in the Social Object condition would show facilitated 
performance on the inhibitory control performance given previous findings indicating 
that passive social presence can facilitate performance on such tasks (Marino et al., 2015) 
and based on Beckes and Coan’s (2011) Social Baseline Theory which argues that the 
presence of others helps individuals conserve important and often metabolically costly 
somatic and neural resources. For Study 3b, it was hypothesized that there would be a 
similar pattern in the effect of the Happy Eyes social object on inhibitory control by 
child’s theory of mind ability. However, of interest was the direction of the effect, 
facilitative or inhibitive, on inhibitory control, if any, compared to the Angry Eyes 
stimulus.  
Study 3a: The effect of emotionally negative eyes on children’s inhibitory control 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-five 4- to 5-year-old children (31 male) participated in the 
study. There were 32 participants in the Social Object condition (angry eyes) and 33 in 
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the Non Social Object condition (flowers). The mean age was 58.05 months (SD=6.03; 
48-71 months). There was no significant difference in average age between conditions 
(p>.05). Children spoke English as their first language, and were recruited from local 
preschools. Although information on socioeconomic status was not collected, the 
preschools serve a predominantly middle and upper-middle class population. This study 
was approved by the Boston University Institutional Review Board. All participants’ 
legal guardians provided written informed consent in accordance with the university’s 
institutional review board. 
Participants who were accurate on less than half (less than 37 of the 72 total trials) 
were excluded from the study. Additionally, those whose conflict score was negative 
(median RT score was faster on incongruent trials than congruent trials), but had an 
accuracy score on incongruent trials that was below 4 (max=24) were also excluded. 
These exclusionary criteria were used to account for those participants who likely did not 
understand the task or were not attending to the task. In total, 12 participants (5 from the 
Social Object condition, 8 from the Non-social object condition) were excluded. This 
yielded the sample of 65 participants (32 in the Social Object condition, 33 in the Non-
Social Object condition).  
Materials. The pictures of angry eyes and the picture of flowers that were used 
were both black and white and matched for spacing, size, and contrast (see Figure 3 for 
stimulus examples). The pictures were taken from previous research on social presence in 
adults (Ernest-Jones et al., 2011).  The Flanker task developed by Rueda and colleagues 
(Rueda et al., 2004) was used. To assess for children’s Theory of Mind, the Wellman and 
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Liu (2004) Theory of Mind (ToM) battery was administered. This battery measures 
children’s understanding on 5 tasks: Diverse Desires (understanding that different people 
can have different desires for the same thing), Diverse Beliefs (understanding that 
different people can have different beliefs) about the same situation, Knowledge Access 
(understanding that something can be true, but someone might not know that), False 
Beliefs (understanding that something can be true, but someone might believe something 
different) and Hidden Emotion (understanding that someone can feel a certain way but 
display a different emotion) (Wellman & Liu, 2011).  
Measures.  
Flanker Task. Participants were randomly assigned to complete the Flanker Task 
(Rueda et al., 2004) in one of two conditions. In the Social Object condition, a picture of 
eyes (angry emotion) was present at the top of the computer screen used to administer the 
task. In the Non-Social Object condition, a picture of flowers (a non-social object) was 
present at the top of the computer screen (See Figure 4.1 for Stimuli).  
 
 
 
 Figure  4.1. Stimuli used in the (a) Non-Social Object condition (flowers) and the (b) 
Social Object condition (eyes).  Stimuli adapted from Ernest-Jones, Nettle & Bateson, 
2011.  
 
 
a	
b	
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The Flanker task consisted of a total of 24 practice trials and three experimental 
blocks with each block consisting of 24 trials. Each trial represents one of 12 conditions 
in equal proportions: three target types (congruent, incongruent and neutral) x four cues 
(no cue, central cue, double cue and spatial cue). 
Each trial began with a central fixation cross on the computer screen. The target 
array was a yellow colored line drawing of either a single yellow fish or horizontal row of 
five yellow fish, presented above or below fixation, over a blue-green background. The 
participant responded based on whether the central fish pointed to the left or right by 
pressing the corresponding left or right button on the game controller (see Figure 4.2). 
Accuracy and reaction time were recorded. On congruent trials the central fish points in 
the same direction as the flanker points, whereas on incongruent trials it points in the 
opposite direction, and on neutral trials it appeared alone (Fan et al., 2002). The target 
was presented either 1° above or below fixation. Each target is preceded by one of four 
warning cue conditions: a center cue (an asterisk is presented at the location of the 
fixation cross), a double cue (an asterisk appears at the locations of the target above and 
below the fixation cross), a spatial cue (a single asterisk presented in the position of the 
upcoming target), or no cue.  
Participants were told that a hungry fish would appear on the screen and to feed 
the fish by pressing the button on the game controller that matches the direction the fish 
is pointing. Before participants begin, they were first shown index cards to introduce to 
them to the different conditions (neutral, congruent, and incongruent) and to demonstrate 
which button on the game controller would successfully feed the fish. For example, 
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showing them the neutral condition (single rightward/leftward fish stimuli), the 
experimenter asked, “Which button on the game controller would feed that fish?” Next, 
the experimenter, showing the cue card of stimuli in a congruent configuration, said 
“Sometimes the hungry fish swim with other fish. In these cases, remember to pay 
attention to the middle fish and feed that fish using the controller. Which button should 
you press to feed the fish in the middle?” The instructions were repeated with the cue 
card for the incongruent configuration. When participants had demonstrated they 
understood the instructions, they proceeded to the practice trials on the computer. 
Participants were instructed to maintain fixation on the cross in the center of the screen 
throughout the task and to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Each child was 
individually supervised during the practice block and was given feedback and 
encouragement from the experimenter. Finally, participants completed the three test 
blocks with the experimenter sitting away from the participant and no longer received 
trial-by-trial feedback. The practice block took approximately three minutes and each test 
block took approximately five minutes. The entire session usually lasted on average 10-
15 minutes in total. A sticker was given at the completion of each block. 
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Figure 4.2. Schematic of the Flanker Task (Rueda et al., 2004) 
 
Although this task also provides information on vigilance and selective attention, 
for the purposes of this study, we focused on children’s executive control, which involves 
monitoring and resolving conflict in the presence of conflicting information, as the 
dependent measure. Executive control was computed as a Conflict Score. The Conflict 
Score was calculated by subtracting the median RT for Congruent from the median RT 
for Incongruent trials. Larger scores are associated with less efficient control. 
Theory of Mind. Immediately following the completion of the Flanker task, 
children completed the ToM battery (Wellman & Liu, 2004), a well-established, 
psychometrically reliable scale. Research has demonstrated that typically developing 
children tend to pass the Wellman and Liu tasks in a fixed succession from 45 and 64 
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months of age (Peterson, Wellman & Liu, 2005; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Wellman & Liu 
(2004) found that ToM ability significantly increased as the children became older.  
For each task, children were told a story about a protagonist using color 
illustrations and/or toy props, and were asked question(s) related to the story. In order to 
pass the task, the child needed to correctly answer the two target questions related to the 
task. Table 4.1 includes brief descriptions of the tasks and the order in which they were 
administered. A total ToM score (0 to 5) was calculated using the sum of the passed 
tasks. Although the score is scalable (Guttman scale) based on evidence that the 
development of theory of mind follows a longitudinal developmental progression, recent 
findings demonstrated that the progression can “crucially differ” in sequence (Wellman et 
al., 2006; Wellman, Fuxi, & Peterson, 2011) across different cultural groups. Therefore, 
in this study the total score was used and participants were categorized in their ToM 
ability in the low group (ToM score <4; failure to pass the false belief task) or in the high 
group (ToM score >3; passing at least the false belief task). This cutoff was used as 
cross-sectional data demonstrates that most preschool aged children pass three of the five 
tasks, with False Belief and Hidden Emotion tasks typically more difficult and achieved 
later than the other three tasks (Wellman et al., 2011). 
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Table 4.1 Theory of Mind Battery  
 
Results 
There were no differences based on gender or preschool population on Conflict 
Score in preliminary analyses, and so these variables were not included in subsequent 
analyses.  
The effect of minimal social presence on inhibitory control performance 
To explore overall differences in mean Conflict Score between Social Object and 
Non Social Object condition, an ANCOVA was conducted on the average Conflict Score 
reaction time in ms by condition (Social Object, Non-social Object), controlling for age 
Order Task Props Used Premise of Story Target Questions 
1 Diverse 
Desire 
Illustration of 
Carrots and a 
Cookie 
Protagonist prefers 
a food item that is 
opposite of what 
child prefers 
1. What snack will 
she choose? A 
carrot or a 
cookie? 
 
2 Diverse 
Belief 
Illustration of  a 
Garage and 
Bushes 
Protagonist thinks 
her lost cat is in a 
different location 
than where child 
thinks it is 
1. Where will she 
look for her cat? 
In the bushes or 
in the garage? 
 
3 Knowledge 
Access 
Box with 
candles inside 
Child knows what 
is hidden in the 
box while 
protagonist does 
not 
1. Does she know 
what is in this 
box? 
2. Did she see 
inside the box? 
4 False 
Belief 
Band-Aid Box 
with paperclips 
inside 
Child knows what 
is hidden inside 
the Band-Aid box 
while protagonist 
does not 
1. What does she 
think is in the 
box? Bandages or 
paperclips? 
2. Did she see 
inside the box? 
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in months. There was no significant difference in mean Conflict Score between the two 
conditions (F(1,62) = .47, p=.50).  
The effect of minimal social presence on inhibitory control by Theory of Mind 
Performance  
Figure 4.3 displays the mean Conflict Score by ToM performance with or without 
minimal social presence. Inspection of Figure 4.3 indicates participants who scored high 
on ToM (>3) demonstrated facilitated performance in the Social Object condition 
(M=267.62ms), as compared to the Non-social object condition (M=475.85ms). To 
explore the influence of minimal social presence and theory of mind ability on Flanker 
performance, I conducted a 2 (Condition: Social Object, Non-social Object) x 2 (ToM: 
Low, High) ANCOVA on the average Conflict score reaction time, controlling for age in 
months. This analysis revealed a significant Condition x ToM interaction, F(2, 63)= 4.55, 
p=.04. No main effects were significant.  
To explore the interaction further, I conducted a simple main effects test 
separately for each condition. Simple main effects analysis showed that there was a 
marginally significant difference in Conflict scores between participants who scored low 
and those who scored high on ToM in the Social Objects condition (p=.068), but no 
significant difference between those who scored low versus those who scored high in 
ToM in the Non-social Object condition (p=.254).  
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Figure 4.3. Average Conflict Score (ms) by ToM performance with or without minimal 
social presence. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean. 
To examine this further, A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was 
conducted to examine whether ToM level moderated the relationship between Condition 
and Conflict Score. In the first step, Flanker Condition and ToM level were included. 
These variables did not account for a significant proportion of the variance in conflict 
sore, R2= .090, F(2, 62) = .253, p=.78. To avoid potentially problematic high 
multicollinearity with the interaction term, the variables were centered and an interaction 
term between condition and ToM level was created (Aiken & West, 1991). When the 
interaction term between condition and ToM level was added to the regression model, 
this accounted for ΔR2= .055, ΔF(1, 61) = 3.577, p = .063, b = 1.08, t(61) = 1.891, p = 
.063. interaction between condition and ToM level accounted for more variance than just 
Flanker Condition and ToM level alone, which suggests potentially significant 
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moderation between Flanker Condition and ToM level on conflict score. Examination of 
the interaction plot (Figure 4.4) Analysis of the moderation effect  using conditional 
process modeling by Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro indicated that the relationship 
between Flanker Condition and Conflict Score was not significant for participants with 
low ToM level, β = -170.73, SE = 159.74, 95% CI [-490.38, 148.92], t(4) = -1.07, n.s, but 
near significant for those with high ToM level, β = 270.20, SE = 137.60, 95% CI [-5.14, 
545.53], t(4) = 1.96, p = .05. 
 
Figure 4.4. Average Conflict Score (ms) by ToM performance with or without minimal 
social presence. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean. 
The effect of minimal social presence on flanker accuracy interference by Theory of Mind 
Performance  
In order to further examine the facilitative effect of mere social presence, flanker 
interference was also examined by accuracy interference. Typically, participants reliably 
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not only respond faster on congruent flanker trials than on incongruent flanker trials, but 
also tend to be more accurate. Figure 4.4 displays average accuracy interference 
(Congruent Accuracy – Incongruent Accuracy) across conditions and theory of mind 
abilities. Inspection of Figure 4.4 indicates that participants who scored high on ToM 
(>3) demonstrated reduced accuracy interference in the Social Object condition 
(M=0.94), as compared to the Non-social object condition (M=2.33). To explore the 
influence of minimal social presence and theory of mind ability on accuracy interference, 
A 2 (Condition: Social Object, Non-social Object) x 2 (ToM: Low, High) ANCOVA on 
the average accuracy interference, controlling for age in months, was conducted. This 
analysis revealed a marginally significant Condition x ToM interaction, F(2, 63)= 3.42, 
p=.04. No main effects were significant. Simple main effects analysis showed that there 
was a significant difference in accuracy interference between participants in the Social 
Object condition who scored low and those who scored high on ToM in the Social 
Objects condition (p=.04), but no significant difference between those who scored low 
versus those who scored high in ToM in the Non-social Object condition (p=.65). 
	
	
75 
 
Figure 4.5. Average flanker accuracy interference by ToM performance with or without 
minimal social presence. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean. 
Discussion 
This study examined the effect of mere social presence, the image of eyes, on 
children’s inhibitory control performance and how this effect may vary by children’s 
theory of mind abilities. I had hypothesized that preschool-aged children with more fully 
developed theory of mind would be more sensitive to the social stimuli and thus be more 
affected by its presence compared to children who have less developed theory of mind. 
Of interest was the direction of its effect, facilitative or inhibitive. Overall, the data reveal 
that inhibitory control performance of children who had more advanced theory of mind 
was facilitated by the presence of a picture of eyes.  
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effect of mere 
social presence in the form of a picture of eyes on children’s inhibitory control 
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performance. Consistent with the Social Baseline Theory literature, social presence, even 
when manifested as a picture of eyes, facilitated children’s performance on a Flanker 
task. The picture of eyes engaged response inhibition processes and primed the inhibition 
of prepotent responses. However, this facilitative effect was only evident in children who 
had advanced theory of mind abilities, suggesting that theory of mind was related to 
children’s sensitivity to the Social Object as hypothesized. Moreover, the image of 
flowers did not have any significant effect on children’s Flanker performance for both 
those with less developed or more advanced theory of mind abilities. These findings are 
important in that it could indicate that the image of eyes, although just a picture, induced 
a feeling of being watched. At the same time, these results should be interpreted with 
caution, given that the mediation analysis did not indicate significant direct or indirect 
relation. Nonetheless, they provide preliminary findings that are consistent with prior 
research, which demonstrate that social influence can be experienced even in the absence 
of the actual physical presence of others (Allport, 1954; Blascovich, 2002). More 
specifically, that even a picture of eyes or an eyelike stimulus can evoke the feeling of 
being “watched” and in turn significantly affect people’s behavior and cognitions (Haley 
& Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al., 2006; Rigdon et al., 2009). Moreover, as Rigdon et al. 
(2009) argued, even a weak social stimulus, such as a visual stimulus representing 
watching eyes, can automatically activate the cognitive representations of being watched 
by others because this process is so fully ingrained into unconscious social cognition.  By 
this argument, it is not surprising therefore, that the picture of eyes only had a significant 
effect for those children who had more fully developed theory of mind, given that theory 
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of mind development is the basis of social cognition (Astington, 1993; Astington, 2008). 
However, these results should be interpreted with caution, given that the mediation 
analysis did not indicate significant direct or indirect relation. 
While the findings from this study add to the literature on the influence of mere 
social presence on children’s inhibitory control performance, further research is needed to 
identify the underlying processes for the facilitative effect of the Social Object on 
children’s ability to monitor and resolve conflict in the presence of conflicting 
information. Facilitating attention has been one way in which social presence has been 
shown to improve the capacity for inhibitory control. The Social Object could have 
changed the scope of attention from a broad focus to narrow focus and vice versa (Lutz, 
Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 2008).  
Some research suggests that attention is improved due to increased arousal that is 
induced by social presence. In this study, the Social Object was a picture of angry eyes. 
Research indicates that perception of angry faces is arousing, which in turn can speed up 
and increase the attention of the observer (Frijda, 2007; Lang, 1995; Ledoux, 1996). 
Indeed, a number of studies indicate that threatening faces activate the amygdala, which 
is tasked to attract attention to incoming stimuli (Adolph, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 
1994; Pourtois, Thut, Grave de Peralda, Michel & Vuilleumier, 2005). By this reasoning, 
the emotional valence of the eye stimulus could have differing effects on arousal, 
attention and speed, and ultimately the facilitation of inhibitory control performance. In 
order to examine this further, the following study examined the effect of an image of 
happy eyes on children’s performance.  
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Study 3b: The effect of emotional valence of an image of eyes on children’s 
inhibitory control performance 
In addition to internal factors (children’s ToM), the nature of the social stimuli is 
also important to examine. In the first study, the eye stimulus exhibited an angry emotion 
and it is important to explore the role of the emotional valence of the eye image. 
Research has demonstrated that cognitive control processes can be modulated by affect 
and emotion (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Oaksford, Morris, Granger, & Williams, 
1996; Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002). Thayer 
(1989) proposed in his biopsychological model of emotion that emotions are linked to 
general bodily arousal, which has conscious components of energy (versus tiredness) and 
tension (versus calmness). Based on this model, Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli and Muraven 
(2007) argued that positive affect could then counteract ego depletion and could replenish 
ego resources associated with self-regulation. They confirmed their theory by finding that 
positive affect did indeed significantly improve participants’ self-regulation performance 
from their initial act of self-regulation when participants were in the positive mood 
induction conditions, as opposed to neutral or sad mood induction conditions. While the 
underlying mechanism of the improved performance is unclear from this study, positive 
affect has been shown to improve cognitive flexibility on various cognitive tasks in other 
studies (Ashby et al., 1999) as well.  
On the other hand, there is also growing evidence that this increased cognitive 
flexibility goes along with increased distractibility as positive mood can result in wider 
attentional focus (Dreisbach, 2006; Dresibach & Goschke, 2004; Rowe, Hirsh, Anderson, 
	
	
79 
& Smith, 2007). For instance, Rowe et al. (2007) found that positive affect impaired the 
ability to selectively focus on the target leading to increased processing of spatially 
distant flanking distractors on a Flanker task. They interpret this finding by suggesting 
that positive mood reflects a global relaxation of inhibitory control (Hasher, Lustig, & 
Zacks, in press; Friedman & Miyake, 2004 as cited in Rowe et al., 2007), which results in 
a shift from a narrow, focused state to a more broad and diffuse attentional focus (Rowe 
et al., 2007). On the other hand, they suggest that the evocation of anxiety or fear-related 
states can lead to attentional narrowing (Derryberry & Reed, 1988; Christianson & 
Loftus, 1990 as cited in Rowe et al., 2007).  
There is also a body of research that suggests that the effect of emotional stimuli 
on cognitive control is due not to the emotional valence, but the degree of arousal that the 
pictures induce. Verbruggen and De Houwer (2007), for instance, found that seeing 
emotional stimuli (positive, neutral, or negative picture) prior to performing a stop-signal 
task, which assesses the efficiency in inhibiting planned responses (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008), significantly impaired inhibitory control (Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007) by 
prolonging participants’ time to stop a preplanned response (stop-signal reaction time, 
SSRT) regardless of the valence of the emotional stimulus. Furthermore, they found that 
high-arousal pictures interfered more with responding and stopping than low-arousing 
pictures, while the valence of the pictures had little or no effect. Similarly, Vogt et al. 
(2008) found that high arousal stimuli resulted in response latencies from slower 
disengagement of spatial attention than from low arousal stimuli, and that this effect was 
independent of the valence of the pictures. These findings support previous work that 
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suggests that attentional biases are driven by the degree of arousal of the stimuli rather 
than by their emotional valence (Schimmack, 2005). At the same time, my findings from 
the previous study demonstrate that picture of angry eyes, which could be considered a 
high arousal or a negative affect image, had facilitative effects on children’s performance 
on a Flanker task.  
Given the mixed findings, it remains unclear as to what effect, facilitative or 
inhibitive, the picture of happy eyes would have on inhibitory control performance. 
However, what is clear is that affect, when expressed through gaze, while implicit is yet a 
potentially salient cue in one’s environment that can have significant and differential 
effects on inhibitory control. However, to date no study has examined whether the effect 
of minimal social stimuli on children’s inhibitory control can be moderated by the 
emotional valence of the stimuli. 
For Study 3b, it was hypothesized that there would be a similar pattern in the 
effect of the Happy Eyes social object on inhibitory control by child’s theory of mind 
ability. However, of interest was the direction of the effect, facilitative or inhibitive, on 
inhibitory control, if any, compared to the Angry Eyes stimulus.  
Method 
Participants. An additional 41 4-and 5-year-old children (23 males) participated 
in this study. The mean age was 57.52 months (SD=8.21). 
Procedure. Children completed the Flanker Task with a picture of happy eyes 
(see Figure 4.6 for stimulus) at the top of the computer screen. Following the Flanker 
task, children completed the ToM battery.  
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Figure 4.6. Happy Eyes Stimulus 
Results 
Figure 4.6 displays the mean Conflict Score by ToM performance for each 
condition (Angry eyes, Happy eyes, Flowers). Inspection of Figure 4.6 indicates that 
participants in the Happy Eyes condition performed similarly with those in the Flowers 
condition. A 3 (Condition: Angry Eyes, Happy Eyes, Non-social Object) x 2 (ToM: Low, 
High) ANCOVA on Conflict score, controlling for age in months was conducted. There 
were no significant main effects or interactions.  
 
 
Figure 4.7. Average conflict score (ms) by ToM performance across conditions in 
Studies 3a and 3b. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean. 
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A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine whether 
ToM level moderated the relationship across the three conditions and Conflict Score. In 
the first step, Flanker Condition and ToM level were included. These variables did not 
account for a significant proportion of the variance in conflict sore, R2= .010, F(2, 103) = 
.500, p=.608. To avoid potentially problematic high multicollinearity with the interaction 
term, the variables were centered and an interaction term between condition and ToM 
level was created (Aiken & West, 1991). When the interaction term between condition 
and ToM level was added to the regression model, this accounted for ΔR2= .027, ΔF(1, 
102) = 1.843, p = .178, b = .317, t(6) = 1.357, p = .178. The interaction between 
condition and ToM level accounted for more variance than just Flanker Condition and 
ToM level alone, which suggests potentially significant moderation between Flanker 
Condition and ToM level on conflict score. Examination of the interaction plot (Figure 
4.8) showed a significant difference in conflict score between participants with low ToM 
and high ToM in the Angry Eyes Condition, but not for the other conditions. Using 
conditional process modeling with Flanker Condition dummy coded as Social Object or 
Non-social Object condition and ToM level (low ToM, high ToM) by Hayes (2013) 
PROCESS macro confirmed this; there were no effects of condition for either Social 
Object, Non-Social Object, or ToM level, but the interaction of ToM level and Social 
Object Conditions neared significance, Beta =  424.30, t(6) = 1.93, p = .057. 
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 Figure 4.8. Average Conflict Score (ms) by ToM performance for angry eyes, happy 
eyes, and flowers conditions. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean. 
Discussion 
Contrary to my hypothesis, the happy eye stimulus did not have a significant 
effect on children’s inhibitory control performance on the Flanker task, even for those 
children with a more fully developed theory of mind. In fact, there were no significant 
differences in average Conflict Score between children in the Happy Eyes condition and 
those in the Flowers condition. Therefore, although the picture of happy eyes was a 
positive emotional stimulus, it did not have the facilitative effect that has been 
demonstrated by other types of positive emotional stimuli in prior studies.  
Why did the picture of angry eyes, not the picture of happy eyes, have a 
facilitative effect for children with more fully developed theory of mind. Some research 
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indicates that people show more interference on flanker tasks when in a happy mood. 
Rowe, Hirsch and Anderson (2007) suggested that happiness engenders broadening of 
spatial attention. This then causes increased susceptibility to spatially proximate 
distractors, which in turn impairs performance (Rowe et al., 2007). On the other hand, 
anxiety and other negative moods have been shown to narrow spatial attention (Erez & 
Isen, 2002; Fredrickson, 1998, 2003, 2004; Fredrickson& Branigan, 2005; Gasper, 2004; 
Gasper & Clore, 2002; Rowe et al., 2007; Storbeck & Clore, 2005; Wadlinger & 
Isaacowitz, 2006). For example, participants were found to be faster to focus on the 
central target and resolve conflict after anxious mood inductions (Wegbreit, Franconeri, 
& Veeman, 2014). This suggests that one possible explanation for my findings is that the 
picture of angry eyes induced an anxious state, which in turn narrowed children’s 
attention. Thus children were faster to focus on the center target and resolve response 
conflict. However, these prior studies experimentally manipulated mood (i.e. used music 
to induce affective states), whereas in my studies mood induction was not controlled for 
nor were participants assessed for any changes in mood at the time of the task. It may be 
presumed that viewing more pleasant (happy eyes, flowers) stimuli versus an unpleasant 
(angry eyes) stimulus induced positive versus negative emotional states, but because this 
was not directly examined it is unclear if mood state was an underlying reason for the 
social presence effect.  
Another possible explanation for my findings is that the social presence effect of 
the Social Object stimuli was driven by the degree of arousal of the stimuli rather than by 
its emotional valence. Indeed, some studies have shown that arousal levels can influence 
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cognitive processing, regardless of an individual’s mood state (Brunye et al., 2009; 
Corson & Verrier, 2007; Jefferies et al., 2008). By this explanation, a picture of angry 
eyes may have increased arousal, which in turn improved executive control, the picture of 
happy eyes likely did not affect children’s arousal and thus did not influence children’s 
inhibitory control performance, positively or negatively. This is consistent with research 
that found that adults who experienced positive valence had less efficient control over 
their responses on a flanker task than those who experienced negative valence, but only 
when arousal levels were high (McConnell & Shore, 2011). Therefore, rather than 
viewing mood and arousal as separate and independent effects, they may have had 
interactional effects on inhibitory control.  
General Discussion 
Despite the large body of research on the influence of social presence on 
cognitive control processes, the two studies presented in this chapter were the first to 
examine whether this influence can also be demonstrated when social presence was in the 
form of a mere picture of eyes. Given the previous findings that have shown that a picture 
of eyes could induce the feeling of being watched in the context of influencing prosocial 
behavior, my studies aimed to extend this to the context of cognitive control.   
In Study 3a, I found that children with advanced theory of mind abilities 
demonstrated facilitated performance in the presence of an image of angry eyes during a 
flanker task. This facilitated performance was not evident in those children who 
performed the task in the presence of a non-social object, a picture of flowers. To explore 
if this effect would vary by emotional valence of the social stimulus, in Study 3b I 
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examined the influence of a picture of happy eyes on children’s executive control 
performance. Contrary to my hypothesis, the image of happy eyes did not have a 
significant effect on performance, facilitative or inhibitive, on children’s executive 
control performance, regardless of their theory of mind abilities.  
Although some studies have demonstrated that negative emotional stimuli leads to 
more drifts in attention (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles & Phillips, 2009), reduced 
executive control on a flanker task (Dennis et al., 2008), and reduced conflict monitoring 
(Padmala et al., 2011), the results from these studies confirm those studies which indicate 
that negative emotional stimuli when it increases the observer’s arousal can result in 
heightened and narrowed attention, which in turn can improve executive control 
(McConnell & Shore, 2011). The findings from my studies add to the literature that 
purports that attention and executive control is driven by the degree of arousal of the 
stimuli rather than just by their emotional valence (Schimmack, 2005). However, in order 
to specifically identify the underlying mechanisms of the social stimuli direct measures of 
heart rate monitoring, eye tracking, or even event-related brain potentials (ERPs), would 
help elucidate the findings from these studies.  
At the same time, these findings raise other questions that can be explored in 
future studies. For example, given that the picture of eyes is of that of a White male, 
examining whether race or gender of the stimulus and how that might interact with the 
race or gender of the participants could also reveal novel and interesting findings that 
would deepen our understanding of the effect of mere social presence, and also more 
broadly the child’s social context, on children’s self-control abilities.  
	
	
87 
Finally, another aspect of the effect of angry eyes on inhibitory control 
performance that should be examined is the duration of its effect. Several studies have 
demonstrated that processing of emotional faces is relatively low and short-living. For 
example, some have shown that it requires less than 200ms to process emotional faces 
(e.g. Eimer & Holmes, 2002; Halgren, Raij, Marinkovic, Jousmaki, and Hari, 2000). 
Therefore, examining reaction times in congruent and incongruent trials across the course 
of the task would provide further information as to the social stimulus effects. In addition, 
exploring the duration of this effect not just across the duration of the task, but over time 
is also question that can be examined in future studies.  
A limitation of this study is that it did not fully explore the participants’ 
perceptions of the stimulus, such as their recognition of the stimulus and/or its valence. A 
small sample of participants (N=19) were asked the following questions after the study: 
1) Do you notice anything on the computer? 2) When did you notice the eyes? Before 
you started the game or just now? 3) What is the person feeling? This information if 
gathered from all of the participants would have enriched my understanding of the results 
and better identify the mechanisms by which minimal social presence exerted its 
influence. From the small sample of participants (N=19) who were debriefed after the 
study, I found that 86% of those in the Angry Eyes condition noticed the eyes before 
starting the task, whereas only 25% in the Flowers condition and 50% of those in Happy 
Eyes condition noticed the stimuli before the task. Approximately half of the participants 
reported noticing the stimuli after the task/during the follow up questions in these latter 
conditions; these participants were mostly low ToM. Moreover, whereas all of these 
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participants who were in the Angry Eyes condition correctly identified the emotion of the 
eyes, a little over half of the participants in the Happy Eyes condition identified the 
emotion of the stimulus correctly. Although the sample is quite limited and therefore it is 
difficult to make generalizations from these findings about the full sample of participants 
in my studies, it provides some indication that the Angry Eyes may be more salient and 
easily identifiable than the Happy Eyes.  
Taken together, the results of Studies 3a and 3b indicate that children are not only 
influenced by top-down processes when learning about self-regulation, but also are 
influenced by bottom-up processes including the presence or absence of social cues in 
their environment. Future research should explore how such bottom-up cues could be 
paired with top-down explicit interventions to maximize the likelihood of learned 
strategies. 
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Chapter 5: Summary and Significance 
Summary 
Although children’s inhibitory control abilities are to some extent shaped by 
individual predispositions, such as temperament or gender, and may naturally develop 
with age, social influences also significantly affect young children’s developing self-
control abilities. The goal of this dissertation was to experimentally examine two 
different means through which social factors can influence children’s inhibitory control 
abilities: 1) a top down approach, through modeling of self-control skills, and 2) a bottom 
up approach via increased arousal due to their mere presence in the child’s environment.  
 In Chapters 2 and 3, I examined the social transmission of effective strategies 
using laboratory-based experiments to systematically explore variables that may affect 
children’s acquisition of self-control strategies from adults. Although children are prolific 
imitators and have a strong inclination to imitate even when actions of a model have no 
apparent purpose or causal function or even when they are directly instructed not to do so 
(Lyons et al., 2007), the social environment is an important factor in modulating the 
actions that children imitate (Nielsen, 2009; Over & Carpenter, 2013). In fact, social 
factors, such as the reliability of the model or the social group status of the model, have 
been shown to influence how likely children are to copy certain models (Howard, 
Henderson, Carrazza, & Woodward, 2015). Reliance on adults may be particularly 
beneficial to learning appropriate and culture-dependent behaviors, such as self-control 
strategies. However, in naturalistic contexts there is an increased likelihood of children 
being faced with conflicting verbal and behavioral information from adults, which may 
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be especially the case in the context of teaching and modeling self-control. For example, 
parents may state the importance of not snacking before meals, but then do it anyways. In 
Chapter 2, I explored the effect of adult’s verbal and behavioral information on children’s 
learning of self-regulatory strategies with a particular interest in the cases when the 
verbal and behavioral information conflict. Although the old adage, ‘do what I say, not 
what I do’ is what many parents hope children are doing, my findings revealed that 
actually ‘actions speak louder than words.’ Children privileged the adult model’s 
behavior over her stated intent to wait/not wait. In other words, the adult’s delay of 
gratification (successful or not successful) significantly predicted children’s imitation of 
the modeled strategies and whether they successfully waited, regardless of what they said 
they would do and what is important to do. So even when adults stated the importance of 
waiting and their intent to wait, but if they did not then successfully wait, children were 
significantly less likely to imitate the strategies and successfully complete the task.  
Moreover, in addition to examining the role of the information provided by an 
adult model, I investigated the role of model characteristics. Specifically, in Chapter 3, I 
explored whether children demonstrate a preference to learn self-control strategies from a 
racially ingroup versus a racially outgroup adult.  Interestingly, I found an absence of 
significant racial group preference in a sample of children of minority background 
(Chinese American), but found significant racial group preferences among Caucasian 
children. Caucasian children were significantly more likely to imitate modeled strategies 
and to successfully wait when they observed an adult who was a racial ingroup member 
versus a racial outgroup member (East Asian). Moreover, these findings were even more 
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robust for the 5-year-old children, suggesting that racial group preferences may develop 
with age.   
Together the findings from these studies confirm previous findings that preschool-
aged children do indeed rely on imitation as a learning mechanism even when learning 
how to successfully delay gratification. Moreover, the findings also highlight that 
children are not blind imitators and that social factors can influence the extent to which 
children imitate (Nielsen & Blank, 2001; Over & Carpenter, 2009). The first two studies 
of my dissertation highlight some conditions that appear to influence children’s efficient 
acquisition of self-control skills.  
These results have important implications on how to promote learning of self-
control skills. Most of the focus of research and practice of self-control teaching has been 
on content of the teaching and there has been less consideration of the social factors that 
affect the effective learning of the content. It is important to consider these factors when 
developing interventions and teaching children self-control skills. My findings indicate 
that the preschool-aged children in this study did not blindly imitate or simply acquire 
whatever skills were taught by adults. Therefore, while it is important for interventions to 
develop solid content and instruction for self-control curricula or trainings, it may be 
important to also consider contextual factors that increase the likelihood that the skills 
taught will be successfully transmitted and utilized by children. Additionally, my findings 
highlight the importance of a ‘match’ between the racial group membership of the 
instructor for Caucasian children, this was not the case for Asian American children. 
Chapter 4 presented two studies that demonstrated that social factors can also influence 
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inhibitory control abilities through implicit means as well. Even the presence of a mere 
picture of eyes significantly facilitated children’s performance on an inhibitory control 
task. Importantly, this effect was only evident among children with more fully developed 
theory of mind, suggesting that theory of mind (ToM) ability underlies children’s 
sensitivity to social cues. Furthermore, I found that the facilitative effect was only 
induced by the picture of angry eyes, not the happy eyes, which may suggest that increase 
of arousal may have been a mechanism by which the social stimulus affected 
performance. The results from these studies not only add to the current literature on the 
influence of mere social presence on cognition and behavior, but it also suggests that this 
effect can be induced by a mere picture of eyes. Although the mere presence of a picture 
of eyes have been shown to impact adult’s prosocial behavior (Bateson et al., 2006; 
Ernest-Jones et al., 2011) and cooperative behavior (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Fehr & 
Schneider, 2010), my studies were the first to demonstrate its effect on children’s 
inhibitory control. 
Significance and Implications 
Although experimental designs are not direct representations of naturalistic 
settings like the classroom or home environment, they nonetheless help systematically 
identify the factors that can influence children’s self-control skills. This in turn can 
provide crucial information that can inform how we can promote young children’s 
inhibitory control abilities. The studies presented in Chapter 2 and 3 provide novel 
findings on the social factors that influence children’s imitation of self-control skills from 
adults. More specifically, the findings confirm prior research demonstrating that social 
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factors affect the extent to which children imitate, as well as extend this research by 
demonstrating this in the context of learning novel self-control skills. To the best of my 
knowledge, these studies were the first to experimentally examine social factors that 
influence preschool-aged children’s imitation of self-control skills,   
In the classroom, home, or therapy setting, the findings from the first study 
demonstrate that relying primarily on verbal reasoning or instruction to engage in 
regulatory strategies is ineffective, especially when it is not followed through with 
successful regulation. In other words, when a parent instructs their child to wait, explains 
the importance of waiting, teaches them strategies to help them wait, and yet does not 
model successful waiting themselves, their child will be significantly less likely to utilize 
the taught strategies and to successfully wait. Most caregivers can attest that despite their 
best intentions there is usually a lack follow through and consistency in their own 
modeling of regulation on the day to day. Below I will discuss the implications of Study 
1 and 2’s findings for both therapy and educational practices. 
Impact of Top-Down Processing  
Although school readiness used to be determined primarily by the child’s 
emergent literacy and academic skills (Snow et al., 1998; Whitehurst and Lonigan, 1998), 
recently, there has been greater focus on the early development of self-regulation skills as 
they relate to the ability to control behavior, attention, and emotions for the purpose of 
learning (Bierman et al., 2008; Blair, 2002; McClelland et al., 2000). Moreover, self-
regulation has been shown to not only be significantly associated with school readiness, 
but also overall school success and achievement, social competency, and other positive 
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life outcomes across the lifespan. Research has shown that intervening at the preschool 
level can help reduce behavioral problems and improve academic achievement, which are 
fundamental components of school readiness (Blair & Razza, 2007; Lengua, Honorado, 
& Bush, 2007).  
Given the importance of promoting self-regulation skills in the preschool years, 
many interventions have been developed and implemented to target this age group. Some 
widely known interventions include, The Incredible Years (Webster-Stratto et al., 2008), 
Project Star (Kaminski and Stormshak, 2007), Promoting Alternative Thinking Skills 
(PATHS; Greenberg et al., 1995), Early Risers’ “Skills for Success” Program (August et 
al., 2007), and First Step to Success (walker et al., 1998). Additionally, there are also 
school-based interventions that attempt to measure and/or remediate children’s self-
regulation skills, such as the Research-Based Developmentally Informed (REDI) Head 
Start innovation (Bierman et al., 2008), the Chicago School Readiness Project (CSRP; 
Raver et al., 2009), and the Tools of the Mind Curriculum (Bodrova and Leong, 2007). 
However, although these interventions were based on strong theoretical orientations and 
research, most of them function under the assumption that children’s self-regulation skills 
can be improved with direct training with children and emotional support for and 
coaching of teachers and/or parents (i.e. Bernier et al., 2010; Lengua, Honorado, & Bush, 
2007). For instance, mental health consultants provide individual and group therapies to 
improve children’s socioemotional adjustment (Webster-Stratton et al., 2004, 2008) 
and/or parent or teacher coaching to help them learn effective behavioral management 
strategies (i.e., use of praise, selective ignoring, redirection and setting limits, 
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development of positive relationship between with children, engagement in problem 
solving).  
What is not made as explicit or even included as a primary component in most or 
all of these interventions is an emphasis on adults (parents and/or teachers) own modeling 
of self-regulation and of the regulatory strategies taught to children. My findings would 
suggest that the efficacy of these interventions could be significantly strengthened by 
integrating intentional and explicit modeling of skills by teachers as part of the 
curriculum, as well as training parents to not only utilize effective parenting skills, but 
also to demonstrate the strategies and regulation that they would want to see in their 
children in the day to day. For example, as part of the social-emotional curriculum, 
teachers can lead a lesson where they demonstrate specific regulatory skills, such as the 
Turtle Shell Technique (Schneider, 1974), not only using puppets and in-vivo training, 
but also through explicit live modeling. For example, one of the teachers could present a 
frustrating situation, “Ms. Grace just got teased. Let’s see what happens next.” Ms. Grace 
could then state “I am feeling really angry because they made fun of me. I am going to 
‘Do the Turtle’ to help me feel less angry” and then proceed to model emotion labeling 
and deep breathing strategies of the Turtle technique. The other teacher would point out 
each strategy as it is being modeled by Ms. Grace (i.e. “Look Ms. Grace is taking some 
space to calm down,” “Look Ms. Grace is now breathing in and out slowly to help her 
calm down”). After modeling the strategies, Ms. Grace would then say something like “I 
feel less angry now.” Moreover, it is critical that teachers then continue to model the 
Turtle Technique whenever the opportunity arises in real life situations. Parents should 
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also be reinforcing children’s learning of the strategies by actively modeling them at 
home. My findings would suggest that this consistent modeling of self-regulation by 
adults would be just as if not more effective than simply instructing children to use the 
skills.  
This approach would also apply to clinical work with young children whereby it 
is important that the therapist not only teaches via modeling of strategies during session, 
but also emphasizes the importance of promoting active engagement of parents in and out 
of therapy. Children may be taught to identify and name their feelings, engage in deep 
breathing, and other emotion and behavior regulation skills, but the teaching of these 
skills are reinforced through consistent active modeling in session and outside of session. 
More often than not, children who are coming in for therapy are not observing these skills 
consistently and successfully modeled in their everyday lives, especially by those who 
are important figures in their lives (caregivers). In fact, I would suggest that therapeutic 
interventions that seek to reduce problem behavior (behavioral regulation problems, 
anxious/avoidant behaviors) for preschool-aged children should focus primarily on parent 
training, even over individual work with the child. The training would seek to improve 
not only parents’ parenting skills in how to respond to problem behavior, but also their 
own regulatory skills so that they are modeling adaptive regulatory behavior more 
consistently and overtly. As my findings highlight, a critical way in which children 
develop their regulatory skills is through observation and imitation of adults. 
In addition to considering how to best teach regulatory skills to children 
(emphasizing modeling of successful self-control), it is also important to consider the 
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characteristics of the model. Most current interventions do not consider the race of the 
teacher when teaching preschool-aged children self-regulation skills. My findings 
highlight the importance of exploring non-WEIRD (White Educated, Industrialized, Rich 
and Democratic; Henrich et al., 2010) samples prior to making generalizations about the 
effectiveness of interventions. Research on student-teacher racial congruence has focused 
primarily on how it matters and benefits minority students. However, there are not many 
studies that focused on how it matters for Asian American students. Moreover, to the best 
of my knowledge no study has experimentally examined the role of student-teacher racial 
congruence in the context of teaching self-regulatory skills. My results revealed that 
although both Asian American and White children tend to prefer their racial ingroup 
members when learning these skills, this preference was only significant for White 
children. My findings highlight the implications of student-teacher racial congruence for 
Caucasian students in that we find that, from an early age, Caucasian children are 
significantly more likely to learn novel behaviors from a racial ingroup member versus an 
outgroup member, specifically an East Asian adult. Although my findings indicate that 
minority preschool-aged students can benefit from a same race teacher in the context of 
learning self-control skills, I found that this was not necessarily the case for Chinese 
American children.  
One reason that Chinese American children may have shown less of an ingroup 
preference compared to the White children may have been due to cultural values. For 
instance, Chinese culture is highly influenced by Confucian ideals, which include respect 
for and compliance with authority and importance of education (Van Campen & Russell, 
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2010). Therefore, Chinese children’s respect for teachers may have trumped ingroup 
preferences. This explanation would then suggest that children from other minority 
groups for which this value is less prominent would demonstrate a stronger ingroup 
preference. This is an area that could be explored in future research.  
Another explanation for the in-group bias among the majority group may be a 
result of the overwhelming majority of Caucasian adults engaged in teaching or in 
healthcare (82% of teachers, U.S. Department of Education Schools and Staffing Survey, 
2013; 75% of healthcare providers, AAMC, 2010). Despite the increasing diversity 
among our student population in this country, the racial diversity among teachers has 
remained largely the same. According to the 2016 report (The State of Racial Diversity in 
the Educator Workforce) by the U.S. Department of Education, the elementary and 
secondary school teacher workforce is not as racially diverse as the population at large or 
that of the general student body. While students of color are expected to make up 56% of 
the student population by 2024, the teacher workforce is still overwhelmingly 
homogenous. Approximately 82% of public school teachers identified as white, and this 
figure has only changed slightly in the past 15 years (U.S. Department of Education 
Schools and Staffing Survey, 2013). For this reason, it is not surprising that the 
Caucasian children in my study showed a significant preference for their own race model 
even at such a young age, while the Chinese children did not demonstrate as strong a 
preference for their own race. Chinese children may be more exposed to Caucasian adults 
on the day to day and/or accustomed to learning from Caucasian adults and thus show 
less of a ingroup bias than the Caucasian children. If this explanation were true, we 
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would also expect Chinese American children to show a stronger in-group preference 
when learning from a model of a different minority group.  
On the other hand, some research indicates that ingroup preferences interacts with 
social learning about the relative status of one’s own group (i.e., race, gender, religion) 
(Jost et al., 2004; Newheiser & Olson, 2012). For example, in the US Whites are in a 
socially dominant position compared with racial minorities, such as Blacks, Hispanics, 
and Asian Americans (Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008). Children are born into these 
societies that are structured by hierarchical arrangement of social groups (Siadnius & 
Pratto, 1999) and even at young ages they internalize these consensual social views 
regarding various social groups (Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008). For example, children 
living in the US likely explicitly or implicitly view the White majority positively while 
other racial groups negatively. From this framework, the findings from my study are not 
surprising. In fact, it is consistent with previous research. For example, Baron and Banaji 
(2006) found that preschool-aged children from minority backgrounds (black) showed no 
ingroup preference whereas the advantaged group (white children) showed more robust 
ingroup preference. 
While the findings from my study may not have direct practice or policy 
implications on teacher recruitment or changes to current interventions, they do highlight 
the need to revisit the current status of racial diversity in the educator workforce and the 
effect of early exposure to diversity on children’s multicultural awareness and 
competence. Increasing teachers of minority background would not only benefit minority 
students, but also Caucasian students. Caucasian children been shown to exhibit negative 
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attitudes toward minority outgroups as early as 4 years of age (Aboud, 1988), when they 
reach early adolescence, they begin to show spontaneous, negative evaluations of racial 
or ethnic outgroups relative to their ingroups (Degner & Wentura, 2010). These ingroup 
preferences can persist across the lifespan (Chen, 2010). In fact, one study found that 
White six-year-olds in the United States exhibited implicit ingroup preference at levels 
statistically identical to White adults; this indicates that there is little developmental 
change in the magnitude of these preferences (Baron & Banaji, 2006). Such findings 
further emphasize the importance of intervening early to develop children’s multicultural 
awareness. Doing so would in turn also help White children be more receptive to learning 
from diverse teachers. 
  Minority teachers can serve as positive role models that help break down 
negative stereotypes and prepare students to live and work in a multiracial society. 
Likely, even more than teaching children culturally sensitive practices to develop their 
multicultural competence, direct interaction and relationship with teachers of color would 
help expand their multicultural awareness and deepen their multicultural sensitivity. Note 
also that in my dissertation, I explored only one minority group. Given that Asian 
participants are often deemed the “model minority” (Chen, 2010) the strong in-group 
effect for Caucasian children in Study 2 is even more striking. Nevertheless, future 
research should explore similar findings across a range of minority group statuses.  
Impact of Bottom-up Processing 
Whereas the findings presented in the first two studies (Chapters 2 and 3) have 
important implications on ways to promote children’s inhibitory control from a top-down 
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approach (i.e. explicit teaching and modeling), findings from Study 3 (Chapter 4) brings 
to light a novel approach to promoting children’s inhibitory control from a bottom-
approach. The literature on mere social presence on children’s performance on executive 
function tasks has focused on the influence of actual presence of a social other (i.e. facing 
away, sitting next to, sitting in front of a child). My findings extend this body of research 
revealing that even a picture of eyes can elicit facilitative effects on children’s inhibitory 
control. These findings highlight how even seemingly minimal social cues in a child’s 
environment can significantly affect their inhibitory control performance. This is not to 
say that a picture of eyes, let alone angry eyes, per se should be utilized to facilitate 
children’s inhibitory control. However, they do broaden our understanding of the social 
and contextual factors that can affect children’s inhibitory control performance. Most of 
our focus in research and in interventions have been on the role of more overt social 
influences. My findings would suggest that social cues in the environment that could 
potentially increase or decrease a child’s arousal can affect children’s cognitive 
interference control. Lastly, another important implication of the findings is that they 
emphasize the need to be more cognizant of even the subtle social cues in children’s 
environment, not just the overt factors. In everyday settings, such as at a child’s school, 
the actual presence or absence of another is emphasized, but there is a lack of attention on 
more subtle social cues in the child’s context, whether that be the disappointed look and 
gaze of the child’s teacher or any other arousal triggering cue in the environment. My 
findings would suggest that even these minimal social stimuli could potentially have a 
significant affect on children’s inhibitory control. Furthermore, given the significant 
	
	
102 
effect of a mere presence of a picture of angry eyes has on their performance, it 
highlights the degree of impact actual presence would have on children’s cognitive 
inhibition and brings to question those children who may lack the social presence, such as 
attentive and present parents, that could promote their inhibitory control. Although 
further research is needed to extend my findings to practical applications for 
interventions, they initiate a conversation on how we can incorporate or consider 
something as simple as eye gaze in enhancing existing interventions.  
Conclusion 
The goal of this dissertation was to experimentally examine two different means 
through which social factors can influence children’s inhibitory control abilities: 1) a top 
down approach, through modeling of self-control skills, and 2) a bottom up approach via 
increased arousal due to their mere presence in the child’s environment. These studies 
provided novel findings that identify the social variables and conditions that affect 
children’s inhibitory control from a top down and bottom up approach. This has 
important implications on how we can optimize teaching of self-control strategies in 
order to promote development of children’s behavioral inhibition, as well as on how we 
understand the implicit role of social context, even seemingly minimal social stimuli, that 
can facilitate children’s cognitive inhibition. 
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